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I. INTRODUCTION

In a 1996 speech on "corporate citizenship," then-Secretary of Labor Robert
B. Reich lamented the passing of a bygone era when chief executives of large
corporations gave greater consideration to the consequences of corporate actions on
workers and their communities.' Reich quoted from a 1951 address by Frank
Abrams, then Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") of Standard Oil of New Jersey:
"The job of management is to maintain an equitable and working balance among the
claims of the various directly interested groups . . . stockholders, employees,
customers and the public at large."2 Reich noted that Abrams's remarks were
typical of the era, and asserted that this balancing of interests was the product of an
implicit social compact between companies, workers, and the communities they
shared. The compact held that so long as a company made a respectable profit, it
could be relied upon to remain in the community and employees could depend on
3
keeping their jobs; anything less was "un-American."
Today this social compact has unraveled. The principal causes, according
to Reich, include deregulation of a number of key industries, information
technology that speeds commercial transactions to levels unimaginable in previous
eras, the growing demands of shareholders to maximize profits, and of course the
globalization of markets for capital, goods, and services.4 The result? Corporations
have begun to engage in a new ruthlessness, maximizing profits at the expense of
all other considerations. Consequently, workers and their communities have borne
the brunt of a new economic order in which labor is increasingly viewed as just
another cost to be squeezed at the expense of community, employee welfare, and
human dignity.
Recent economic trends seem to corroborate Reich's hypothesis. Real
wages for most workers have fallen over the last twenty years, while both corporate
profits and executive compensation have risen.5 For example, between 1979 and

I
United States Secretary of Labor Robert B. Reich, Pink Slips, Profits, and Paychecks:
Corporate Citizenship in an Era of Smaller Government, Address to George Washington University
School of Business and Public Management (Feb. 6, 1996).
2

Id.

3

Id.

4

See id.

5

EcONOMIc POLICY INSTITUTE, THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA
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1995,6 the real (adjusted for inflation) hourly wages of male blue-collar employees
have fallen an average of 16.3%! Men in the service economy have been hit by this
trend even harder: if security services are excluded from the category of service
industries, real wages fell nineteen percent between 1979 and 1995. Wages for
women in these sectors of the economy did not fall as drastically, but they did
register a decline in real buying power. The wages for women fell 6.3% in bluecollarjobs and 8.6% in non-security service industries during the same time period.8
Even more startling is the fact that these wage reductions have been coupled with
job insecurity unparalleled in times of relative health in the national economy; from
1991 to 1993, a period of economic recovery, five percent of men and four percent
of women lost their jobs to downsizing, closure, or permanent layoff.9
Conversely, corporate profits have grown steadily in the same period.
After-tax corporate profits averaged seven percent in 1995, the highest rate since
1959 (the earliest year for which a figure is available). 0 This growth in profits has
been at the expense of wage growth as revenues shift from workers to
shareholders." More drastic is the growth in pay for corporate executives. Total
compensation for CEOs of major corporations in the United States, adjusted for
inflation, rose from $971,000 in 1965 to $4,367,000 in 1995.12 Thus, while in 1965
the average CEO of a major corporation earned 39.5 times more than the average
worker, in 1995 those CEOs' pay had grown to be 172.5 times the average worker,
reflecting an average annual growth rate of 5.16%."
As these figures illustrate, any praise for the current economic state fails to
account for the pressure it has put on most American workers. If the social compact

6

Id.

7

Id.

Id. The difference in decline for the sexes is in part attributable to a reduction in the wage
gap between the sexes. Despite the narrowing of this gap, however, women still earned on average less
than three-fourths the wages of men in 1989. See id. at 145.
8

9

Id. at 17.

10

Id. at 68.

11

Id. at66.

12
Id at 224. Dollar figures are in 1995 dollars. Compensation rates for CEOs include salaries,
bonuses, the value of restricted stock and stock options and the time they were granted, and other long-

term compensation.
13

•,
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has crumbled, it has been to the advantage of those who rely on capital, not labor,
as the source of their income.
Coal miners and their communities stand in a unique position in this new
global marketplace. Because of the contentious history of labor-management
relations in the coal fields, Reich's "social compact" was probably less recognizable
to the average coal miner than it was to employees in other sectors of the economy.
Nonetheless, despite the sometimes intense differences between labor and
management, coal mines were historically unlikely to close as long as the owners
were making a profit. Of course, the compacts reached between the United Mine
Workers of America ("UMWA" or sometimes "Union") and mine operators could
never achieve for workers the degree of stability enjoyed by other industrial unions;
because of the nature of coal mining, coal miners have been experiencing the
uncertainty associated with the "new" marketplace for many years. Miners have
inherentjob instability because their employment depends on the profitable location
and recovery of a limited, non-renewable resource. Coal-mining operations are
constantly opening and shutting down because of considerable effects on their
profitability due to geological difficulties a mine may encounter, various forms of
environmental regulation, and the significant fluctuations in both the price of coal
and the cost of its transportation. These various destabilizing factors have
historically resulted in cycles of intense activity and prolonged layoffs.
The response to these uncertainties for workers in the coal fields was labor
organizing. As a consequence, the UMWA has been a leader among labor unions
in negotiating economic security for its workers. However, the struggle to maintain
economic security in an extractive industry is always a challenge. Over time, the
competitive pressures of the industry have led companies to target the UMWA and
its hard-won concessions as a means of reducing costs. Companies are increasingly
using aggressive tactics to shed their collective bargaining obligations and take
advantage of a legal setting where "cheating" workers out of their hard-fought
contractual rights is an available option to determined employers.
The intent of this Article is to point out how such corporate cheating of
workers occurs, not by the kind of legal analysis typical of law review articles, but
rather by examining the outcomes that result because of particular legal rules, and
how those rules affect workers, their families, and the ability of workers to organize
and bargain collectively with their employer. The Article in no way claims to be
comprehensive, but is rather a collection of short case studies illustrating how
companies have manipulated the law in select areas. Though the case studies are
drawn from the coal industry, they illustrate scenarios that, unfortunately, may
become more and more common across all sectors of the economy.
Parts II and III deal with the vexing problem of successorship, and workers'
ability to maintain their jobs and their collective bargaining agreement during the
transfer of their work site to another employer. Part IV addresses the use of

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol100/iss3/5
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"double-breasting," the practice by employers of operating two companies, one
union and one non-union, to drain away the work of unionized employees into the
non-union firm to reduce labor costs and enhance management control. Part V
outlines coal companies' use of subcontracting to avoid contractual liabilities. Part
VI demonstrates an effort by certain companies to "launder" their obligations to pay
retiree health care benefits to retired miners through a Chapter Eleven bankruptcy
proceeding. The Article concludes with some general principles that should form
the basis of any reform efforts to help ensure increased equity and security for
workers.
II. SUCCESSORSHIP

Kenny Bergstad was forty-five years old in 1994, married with two
children.' 4 He was in his twentieth year as a coal miner at the Glenharold surface
mine near Stanton, North Dakota. Over the course of those twenty years he worked
a number ofjobs at the mine: general laborer, blaster, truck driver, and the oiler on
the dragline. That year, however, he was doing reclamation work, restoring the
mine site to its pre-mining conditions. The active extraction of coal had stopped,
and in a matter of time Kenny Bergstad's twenty-year career as an employee of
Basin Cooperative Services ("BCS") would be over. 5
That is not how Bergstad had expected his coal mining career to end. BCS
had plenty of coal reserves, enough coal to be mined until he retired. Its nearby
Dakota Star Reserves had an expected mining life of eighteen years, enough to keep
Bergstad and his fellow employees employed until retirement 6 There was also a
ready market for the coal. It served its parent company, Basin Electric Power
Cooperative, an eight-state network of about 140 rural electric cooperatives, which
had an ongoing and constant need for coal. Bergstad understood that the Dakota
Star Reserves were covered by his labor contract. In fact, in bargaining the 1988
collective bargaining agreement with BCS, the Union was assured that the reserves

14
Transcript of Trial at 130, International Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Basin
Cooperative Services, Civil No. Al-92-114 (D.N.D. 1994).
15

Id. at 126.

16

Id at 564; see also United Mine Workers of America v. Basin Cooperative Services, 53 F.3d

222, 225 (8th Cir. 1995). The average age of the employees at Glenharold was 45, with an average of
19 years of service at BCS.
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at the Glenharold'mine
were covered under the contract and that the miners working
7
would be the ones to mine the Dakota Star Reserves.'
Bergstad also understood that he was protected from job loss if his mine
was sold to a new employer. He knew his Union's collective bargaining agreement
had a successorship provision, designed to ensure that if BCS sold the mine, it was
responsible for securing a legally binding commitment from the purchaser that it
would honor the collective bargaining agreement. The promise, of course, included
retaining the mine's workforce. 8
Instead of honoring the contract's successorship provision and fulfilling
workers' contractual expectations, Basin Electric and BCS entered into a scheme
to shed the union from its coal mining operations and mine its coal non-union to
reduce labor costs. 9 The plan was simple: BCS sold the Dakota Star Reserves to
the Coteau Properties Company, which mined the coal and sold it back to Basin
Electric for their electric generation needs. The financing of the deal and the
oversight of Coteau's mining operations was to be handled by Dakota Coal
Company, another of Basin Electric's subsidiaries."
When the case went to trial, the Union won a judgment of $6.5 million from
defendants Basin Electric, BCS, and Dakota Coal, whom the jury found to be single
employers, jointly and severally liable for violation of the contract?' The Union
had presented evidence that damages were approximately twelve million dollars, a
figure which included approximately eighteen years worth of future wages, plus
health insurance and lost pension benefits.' The $6.5 million judgment was upheld

17
Transcript of Trial at 127, Basin Cooperative Services, Civ. No. A1-92-114; see also
Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant Basin Cooperative Services' Motion for
Summary Judgment at 4, Basin Cooperative Services, Civ. No. A1-92-114.
18

Transcript of Trial at 125, Basin CooperativeServices, Civ. No. AI-92-114. The collective

bargaining agreement covering the Glenharold Mine, the 1988 Surface Coal Wage Agreement, states
in pertinent part that "BCS promises that its operations covered by this Agreement shall not be sold,
conveyed, or otherwise transferred to any purchaser, executor, administrator, or trustee without first
securing the written agreement of the purchaser, executor, administrator, or trustee to assume BCS's
obligation under this Agreement." An edited version of the language appears in Basin Cooperative
Services, 53 F.3d at 223. Article I is discussed in more detail infra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
19

Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant Basin Cooperative Services's

Motion for Summary Judgment at 7, Basin CooperativeServices, Civ. No. A1-92-114.
20

Id.

21

Judgment, Basin Cooperative Services, Civ. No. A1-92-114.

22

Basin CooperativeServices, 53 F.3d at 225.
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on appeal, and ultimately was distributed, with each employee receiving about
$140,000.2
Thus, Kenny Bergstad and his fifty fellow employees were relatively lucky,
even though they lost jobs paying an average of $40,000 per year, to which they
devoted an average of nineteen years, and from which they had expected to retire.
However, now they face the prospect of working at about half their miner's salary,
and face little chance of earning fringe benefits such as health insurance and
retirement pensions.24 In addition, the United Mine Workers devoted three years
and considerable expense to pursuing the lawsuit on behalf of these fifty employees

in an environment in which hundreds of similar land transactions no doubt occur
every year.
The problem exemplified in Basin is known as "successorship" in labor law
parlance - the problem of what happens to determine the legal status of employees,
their bargaining unit, and their collective bargaining agreement when their work site
changes hands.' In some respects the UMWA has been able to "bargain around"
this problem, because virtually all UMWA contracts in the coal industry contain a
clause that requires employers to secure any purchasers' promise to honor the
UMWA contract as a "successor" if it decides to sell its operations. 2 6 However, this
clause is very unusual in the degree of protection it provides, because few other

labor union have enough leverage to negotiate such terms. Thus, a brief analysis

23

Id. at 222.

24

Il at 225; see also Transcript of Trial at 127, Basin Cooperative Services, Civ. No. A-92-

114.
For a relatively comprehensive overview of successorship issues, see THE DEVELOPING
LABOR LAW 761-850 (Patrick Hardin, ed., 3d ed. 1992); see also Gary P. Nelson, Donald E. Malecki,
& Eric Sobkiewicz, Of Profits and Perils: Acquiring the Assets of a DistressedCoalProducer, 11
EASTERN MIN. L. INSTIT. § 13 (1990).
2

See Article I of the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement ("NBCWA"). The operative
language is found in Article I of the NBCWA of 1998, and in prior National Agreements since 1974:
This Agreement shall be binding upon all signatories, hereto, including those
Employers which are members of signatory associations, and their successors and
assigns. In consideration of the Union's execution of this Agreement, each
Employer promises that its operations covered by this Agreement shall not be
sold, conveyed, or otherwise transferred or assigned to any successor without first
securing the agreement of the successor to assume the Employer's obligations
under the Agreement.
Id at 1. The history and analysis of this provision, from the employer's viewpoint, is summarized in
Thomas P. Geis & Ward L. Smith, LaborLaw Successorship Under the NationalBituminous Coal
Wage Agreement and the Union'sCampaignfor Job Security, 90 W. VA. L. REV. 921 (1988).

26
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of labor successorship issues may illustrate some of the obstacles employees face
in obtaining meaningful job security guarantees.
The problems faced by workers can be summarized by an example of a
fundamental corporate law principle. In a transfer of an ongoing business concern,
a corporation can be sold through a stock sale or an asset sale. If the company is
transferred in its entirety through a stock sale, contractual liabilities remain with the
company. However, if the company transfers all its assets instead of its stock,
contractual liabilities do not generally attach to this "mere" exchange of property
between two companies 8 Because the law of collective bargaining is a specialized
type of contract law, this general rule does not necessarily apply?9 However, the
rule demonstrates the law's bias towards permitting a successor employer to shed
its unionized employees, and replace them with cheaper ones, in the name of the
free flow of capital.3
A series of Supreme Court cases have outlined the basic analysis for
determining the degree to which a successor employer must honor a predecessor's
collective bargaining agreement or recognize the bargaining unit of a newly
acquired venture.3 As a general matter, the National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB" or sometimes "Board") considers four basic issues in determining
whether a new employer must recognize the collective bargaining unit of the
predecessor employer: (1)whether there is "continuity in the workforce,"3' (2)
whether there is continuity in the employing industry,33 (3) whether there is

27

See WILLIAM

M. FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORRATIONS

§ 7122 (per. ed. rev. vol. 1990).
28

See id.

29

See id. at § 7122.40.

30

See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Bums Int'l Security Services, Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972).

See Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 482 U.S. 27 (1987); Howard Johnson
Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Exec. Bd., 417 U.S. 249 (1974); Golden State Bottling Co. v. N.L.R.B., 414
U.S. 168 (1973); Burno, 406 U.S. 272; John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
31

32

Whether members of the bargaining unit continue to enjoy majority status.

33

Whether the successor employer is engaged in substantially the same business venture.
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' and (4) whether and
"continuity in the bargaining unit,"34
how long the work site
5
has been idled prior to the takeover of the new employer.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to give a full explanation of these
different factors and their relative importance. What matters most is that the
determining factors are all within the exclusive control of the new management.
They are all subject to the decision of the new employer because under current law
the employer is in control of the makeup of the new workforce. It is essentially
within the new employer's discretion whether to structure the workforce and the
workplace in a way that avoids successor liability.
This criticism was articulated by Justice Douglas in his dissent in Howard
36 which involved the transfer
Johnson Co. v. DetroitLocal JointExecutive Board,
of a hotel to a new employer?' The former employer, which owned the hotel, sold
all the personal property and leased the real property to Howard Johnson, which
intended to operate the hotel. 8 The hotel had employed fifty-three employees under
the old employer, of whom Howard Johnson hired only nine? 9 The union that
represented the fifty-three employees, who had worked under contracts with
language binding both the employer and its "successors, assigns, purchasers, lessees
or transferees" to the collective bargaining agreement, filed a suit against Howard
Johnson to compel arbitration." The issue that ultimately came to the Supreme
Court was whether Howard Johnson, because of the successorship language in the
contract, had to arbitrate with the union over the extent of its collective bargaining
obligations.4 1
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Marshall, ruled that Howard Johnson
had no duty to arbitrate because it had not employed the entire bargaining unit, or

Whether the bargaining unit remains appropriate under the National Labor Relations Act
(CNLRA") and applicable Board precedent.
34

See FallRiver Dyeing & FinishingCorp., 482 U.S. 27; HowardJohnson Co., 417 U.S. 249;
Golden State Bottling Co., 414 U.S. 168; Burns, 406 U.S. 272; John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 376 U.S. 543.
See also THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 25, at 777-811.
35

36

417 U.S. 249, 265 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).

37

Id. at 249.

38

Id. at 251.

39

Id. at 252.

40

Id. at 251-52.

41

Id.
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at least a substantial enough contingency of the bargaining unit, and thus there was
no basis to presume that the union still enjoyed majority status among the
workforce.42 In a lone dissent, Justice Douglas pointed out the fundamental
unfairness of this criteria:
The majority, by making the number of prior employees retained
by the successor the sole determinative factor (in whether the

collective bargaining unit must be recognized by the new
employer), accepts petitioner's bootstrap argument. The effect is
to allow any new employer to determine for himself whether he
will be bound, by the simple expedient of arranging for the
termination of all of the prior employer's personnel.43
Clearly, such a ruling provides a certain incentive for employers not to

retain a union-represented workforce. 4 Indeed, from the worker's perspective,
allowing the successor employer to avoid future obligations to the union by simply
arranging for the selling company to fire all its workers seems glaringly unfair.
Nonetheless, that is precisely what HowardJohnson holds.
An earlier case, N.L.RB. v. Burns Security Services,45 lays bare the values
which dictate the Court's successorship jurisprudence. 46 Burns involved the
takeover by a new employer of a contract to provide security services. The new
security company ("Bums") hired twenty-seven of the guards formerly employed
by Wackenhut the company that had the contract prior to Bums's successful bid.47

42

Id. at 261.

43

Id. at 268 (])ouglas, J., dissenting).

Of course, Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA prohibits terminating a worker simply because of
his or her union affiliation, and Section 8(a)(5) of the same law requires that employers, and their legal
successors, honor valid collectively bargained agreements. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a). Both the NLRB
and the courts have held that purchasers may be liable for unfair labor practices committed by their
predecessor employers. See, e.g., Golden State Bottling Co., 414 U.S. 168; International Technical
Products Corp., 249 N.L.R.B. 1301 (1980). In general, for Golden State liability to attach, the NLRB
must first find two elements: (1) that the purchaser is indeed a successor under applicable law, and (2)
that it knew of the unfair labor practices at the time that it purchased the business. Golden State, 414
U.S. at 176.
44

45

406 U.S. 272 (1972).

46

Id.

47

Id. at 274.
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These twenty-seven employees were out of a total workforce of forty-two. The
union representing the employees under Wackenhut demanded recognition of the
collective bargaining agreement that they had negotiated with Wackenhut, and
Bums refused.49 The Court ruled that although Bums must bargain with the union
because it retained a majority status in the workforce (twenty-seven out of fortytwo), it did not have to honor the unit's collective bargaining agreement.5 0
Moreover, the Court also found that new employers could essentially never be
forced to accept the terms bargained by its predecessor, (1) because it would be a
violation of Section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act5 for the Board to
enforce the substantive terms of a collective bargaining agreement against a party
who had not agreed to their terms, and (2) such a rule would inhibit the free flow
of capital.5
The argument that the Act prohibits such recognition of a collective
bargaining agreement is a shield for the real value choice that was at issue for the
Court in these cases. The Court could have simply agreed with the NLRB's long
standing policy in favor of labor stability, whereby a bargained-for labor contract
survived a mere change in employers. Such a view could have been reconciled with
Section 8(d) of the NLRA easily enough; if there was a blanket rule that collective
bargaining agreements always applied to successors, the employer would be free to
accept or decline that contract by choosing whether to purchase or take over the
business. 3 The employer would always be able to negotiate a new agreement when
the contract expired. However, the Burns Court found such a rule to be too

48

Id.

49

Id.

50

Id. at 278-82.

51

29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988)

52

Burns, 406 U.S. at 282, 287. Section 8(d) of the NLRA reads in part that the obligation to

bargain in good faith "does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a
concession." 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
Prior to Burns, the general rule was that employers had to at least recognize and bargain with
the union representing a predecessor's employees. See Bums, 182 N.L.R.B. 348 (1970). For example,
in Cruse Motors, Inc., 105 N.L.R.B. 242 (1953), the Board held that where a business changed
ownership the successor was bound to bargain with the predecessor employees' collective bargaining
agent as long as the successor was in the same "employing industry" as the predecessor. Id. at 248.
Indeed, the NLRB's initial holding in Burns itself was that a successor must not only recognize the
union, but must honor a predecessor's collective bargaining agreement, absent unusual circumstances.
See Burns, 182 N.L.R.B. 348. Of course, this rule was short-lived.
53
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restrictive. Instead, it preferred to permit corporate acquisitions to proceed
"unfettered" by consideration of their impact on longstanding employees or on labor
stability.' Of course, the flaw in the Burns/HowardJohnson's approach is that it
fails to protect workers who walk through the company gates on the way to work
each morning and who rely on those jobs to feed their families. After the sale from their perspective - the company gates are still there, but their jobs and their
income have somehow disappeared along with their union contract.
To be fair, the Supreme Court mitigated some of the harshness of these
rules in its 1987 decision in FallRiver Dyeing & FinishingCorp. v. N.L.R.B.. "
There, a manager of a New England textile maker formed a new company,
purchased its predecessor's assets, including its building and inventory, and hired
many of the former workers. However, it refused to recognize the union. The
NLRB held this refusal to be unlawful, finding that Fall River had hired a
"substantial and representative complement" of employees, and that "substantial
continuity" existed between the two enterprises. 6 Reaffirming the paradigm of
employer free choice it had laid out fifteen years earlier in Burns, the Court
declared that "to a substantial extent the applicability of Burns rests in the hands of
the successor. If the new employer makes the conscious decision to maintain
generally the same business and to hire a majority of its employees from the
'
predecessor, then the bargaining obligation of § 8(a)(5) is activated."57
The "substantial continuity" test set forth in Fall River places more
emphasis on the expectations of the employees and the realities of the workplace
than on the change in corporate form emphasized in the earlier cases. Indeed, the
Court cited with approval the Board's framing of the question as
whether 'those employees who have been retained will
understandably view their job situations as essentially unaltered.'[]
This emphasis on the employees perspective furthers the [NLRA's]
policy of industrial peace. If the employees find themselves in
essentially the same jobs after the employer transition and if their

Of course, this freedom does not hurt workers in every case. As the Court points out, there
may be instances where a new employer, by limiting costs and dictating new work conditions, can keep
a company alive that otherwise would have had to close its doors. Burns, 406 U.S. at 287.
54

55

482 U.S. 27 (1987).

56

Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp, 272 N.L.R.B. 839 (1981), affd, FallRiver Dyeing &

FinishingCorp, 482 U.S. 27.
57

FallRiver Dyeing & FinishingCorp,482 U.S. at 40-41.
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legitimate expectations in continued representation by their union
are thwarted, their dissatisfaction may lead to labor unrest."
Thus, the Court moved closer to a "functional," employee-focused analysis. If,
from the employees' perspective, the changeover does not create a "new" company,
but merely attaches a new name to the old one, leaving the basic nature of the
employer-employee relationship unchanged, then the purchaser should be
considered a successor and will be required to bargain with the union. 9 However,
it still need not retain the workforce and need not honor the existing collective
bargaining agreement. Thus, this line of cases still leaves employees extremely
vulnerable because it allows a purchaser to completely disregard any job protections
its employees may have earned under the existing contract with the predecessor
employer.
The Supreme Court's decisions in HowardJohnson and Burns in the early
1970s' effectively invalidated the successorship guarantee found in prior NBCWAs
up to that time, which simply imposed the contract upon any purchaser. The
UMWA's response was to negotiate a new Article I in the 1974 NBCWA, with new
language designed to ensure that a mine operators' existing collective bargaining
obligations would still survive the sale or transfer of the mine"' The "new" Article
I accomplished this aim by requiring the seller of a mining operation to secure the
agreement of the successor employer to honor the collective bargaining agreement
as a condition of the sale, and by holding sellers contractually liable if they fail to
do so. It also gave the Union a cause of action for contract violation against both
the original employer if it fails to secure the commitment of a successor to honor
the collective bargaining agreement and against the successor if it agrees to honor

58

Id. at 43-44 (citing Golden State Bottling Co. v. N.L.R.B., 414 U.S. 168, 184 (1973)).

59

See Geis & Smith, supra note 26, at 929.

60

For discussions of the history of Article , see, e.g. InternationalUnion, UMWA v. Eastover

Mining Co., 603 F. Supp. 1038, 1042 (W.D. Va. 1985); Geis & Smith, supra note 26.
61

The relevant section of Article I reads as follows:
In consideration of the Union's execution of this Agreement, each Employer
promises that its operations covered by this Agreement shall not be sold,
conveyed, or otherwise transferred or assigned to any successor without first
securing the agreement of the successor to assume the Employer's obligations
under this Agreement.

NBCWA of 1993, at 1.
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the contract and then reneges. This provision has proved effective in protecting
union members' jobs in many asset transfer situations.
However, as the Basin situation illustrates, many employers will exert
enormous effort to get out from these obligations.62 Furthermore, even if the union
files and wins a lawsuit for breach of contract, it is difficult if not impossible to
secure the actual jobs at stake, and the best remedy available is usually money
damages, which are no substitute for actual employment. The next section explores
an even more flagrant and unfair attempt by a company to avoid its contractual
obligations, this time by transferring an operation to a related company, then
reopening the facility while denying that Article I applies to the transaction and
refusing to rehire the union members who were laid off by the predecessor.
III. INTRA-CORPORATE TRANSFERS

One of the most egregious examples of contract avoidance occurs when
coal companies engage in intra-corporate transfers to avoid the application of
collective bargaining agreements. In such an instance, a coal mining operation is
transferred from a company that is a signatory to the contract to a related nonsignatory company that attempts to operate the site non-union. To try to evade the
bargained-for obligation to acquire successorship obligations from the purchasing
company, the company will rely on some action that purportedly excuses it from the
provisions of Article I. For instance, it will close an operation prior to the transfer
and claim that, because a mine was not actively producing coal, it was not an
"operation" covered by the agreement. Or, it will transfer a tract of coal reserves
that has been dedicated to a particular mine, and the purchasing company will sink
a new mine shaft into the coal reserves a few hundred feet away from the old portal
and claim the "operation" is a different one than the operation made up of the
UMWA-represented employees who had been mining the reserve for years.6'
Take, for example, the case of the miners who lost their jobs at the Castle
Gate preparation plant in Utah.' Castle Gate and the associated underground
mining operations operated under the NBCWA for many years. Prior to 1979,
Castle Gate was owned and operated by Blackhawk Coal Company, a subsidiary of
62

See supra notes 14-23 and accompanying text.

63

Litigation over the term "operation," as used in Article I of the NBCWA, is discussed infra

at note 78.
This matter is currently being litigated in United Mine Workers ofAmerica v. Cyprus Amax
Coal, Civ. No. 97-Z-34 (D. Colo. filed May 16, 1996) (filed in the United States District Court for the
District of Utah and transferred to the United States District Court for the District of Colorado after
consolidation with a case from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia).
64
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By 1984, both the mine and the
the American Electric Power Company
workforce of both locals had been
entire
the
idled
and
been
had
preparation plant
laid off. As provided by the NBCWA, the UMWA members of both locals
registered for their respective recall panels, and continued to accrue recall and
seniority rights. 6
In 1986, Amax Coal entered into a long-term lease of the Castle Gate
operations and began operating them through its newly established subsidiary,
Castle Gate Coal Company 7 Consistent with the successorship obligations it
assumed under the NBCWA, Castle Gate became a signatory to the 1984 Wage
Agreement and, according to the contract's layoff recall provisions, recalled the
idled workforce that had previously been employed by Blackhawk. It began to mine
coal, and at the end of the contract's term renewed its relationship with the UMWA
by becoming signatory to the 1988 NBCWA 8
In mid-1989, the employees at Castle Gate were again laid off; mining
operations were halted in March.69 The company attributed the work stoppage to
a citation from the Mine Safety and Health Administration, issued because of a
problem with rock bursts.70 Because the mine was not producing coal, the
preparation plant was idled as well. The classified employees were laid off.1 '
In 1993, Amax merged into Cyprus Minerals Company, forming Cyprus
Amax Mineral Company?2 This merger created one of the largest mineral
producing multinational corporations in the world, and what was at the time the
second-largest coal producer in the United States! 3

65

Seel9 COAL OUTLOOK No. 19 at 5, May 15, 1995.

66

Panels are the seniority lists from which employees on layoff are recalled.

67

10 COAL OUTLOOK No. 7, at 6 (Feb. 17, 1986); UP&L ConsideringAMAX Mine Purchase,

U.P.I. WIRE SERVICE (October 19, 1989).
68

Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 9,

UMWA v. Cyprus Amax, Civ. No. 97-Z-374.
69

Castle Gate Suspends Production,U.P.I. WIRE SERVICE (April 8, 1989).

70

Id. "Rock bursts" are a condition in which pressure on a coal seam from the mine roof

causes the coal to burst out of the seam.
71

Id.

72

Marj Charlier, Cyprus Agrees to Buy Amax in Stock Pact,WALL ST. J., May 26, 1993, at A3.

73

t.4
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Shortly after the merger, Cyprus Amax's subsidiary, Cyprus Plateau, began
to take responsibility for Amax Coal's Castle Gate facilities. In December, 1995,
Amax Coal acquired title to the Castle Gate plant and mines from Blackhawk. Two
weeks later, Amax Coal sold the plant to Cyprus Plateau and the associated mines
to Cyprus Western, another Cyprus Amax subsidiary! 4 Work had begun to prepare
the plant for operation in the Fall of 1995, and by February or March of 1996
Cyprus Plateau had employed a small full time crew at the facility! 5 In re-staffing
the Castle Gate plant, Cyprus Amax did not recognize the job rights of Amax's
UMWA-represented employees. When confronted by the UMWA, the company
asserted that Amax's Castle Gate employees did not have recall rights because the
property was owned by Cyprus Amax subsidiary Cyprus Plateau, and that Article
I successorship requirements did not apply because the plant was shut down at the
time of the transfer.76 The anatomy ofthis transaction provides an interesting case
study into the use of the corporate structure to evade contractual liability. Although
Cyprus Amax maintains that this transaction occurred between separate entities, the
and
companies are in fact a conglomerate governed by an overlapping directorship
7
managed through a highly integrated, centralized decision making process.
The company asserts that because the preparation plant was not actively
producing coal, it was not an "operation" under the terms of Article I's
successorship clause, and thus no contract rights attached to Castle Gate. The
proper interpretation of the term "operation" in the NBCWA has a long litigation
history in which companies have argued that a facility must be actively engaged in
the production of coal in order to be considered an operation, and the Union has
argued that an operation covered by the contract, even if shutdown, continues to be
subject to Article I's requirements. 8 Setting aside the merits of Cyprus Amax's

Plaintiff's Ivemorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 31,
United Mine Workers of America v. Cyprus Amax Coal, Civ. No. 97-Z-34 (D. Colo. filed May 16,
1996).
74

75

Id. at 34.

76

Complaint at 56, UnitedMine Workers ofAmerica v. Cyprus Amax Coal, Civ. No. 97-Z-

34.
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Summary Judgment Motion at 17,
United Mine Workers ofAmerica v. CyprusAmax Coal, Civ. No. 97-Z-34.

77

78

The definition of "operation" has been litigated in a number of court cases, with varied

results. See, e.g., UIWA v. Kitt Energy Corp., Civ. No. 87-822 (W.D. Pa. 1987); UMWA v. U.S.
Steel Mining Co., 636 F. Supp 151 (D. Utah 1986); International Union, UMWA v. Eastover Mining
Co., 603 F. Supp. 1038 (W.D. Va. 1985); UMWA v. North Am. Coal Corp., Civ. No. C-2-79-242
(S.D. Ohio 1979).
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position in a more typical arms-length transaction, one is immediately confronted
with the troubling fact that because of the intercorporate nature of the transaction,
and Cyprus Amax's continued accrual of profits from the operation of the plant by
one subsidiary rather than the other, the loss to the Castle Gate workers stands in
particularly sharp contrast to the companies' gain.
One can imagine the opportunities for companies in other industries with
less comprehensive contractual protections than the UMWA to shed contractual
obligations at shutdown facilities in a similar fashion. Given the current state of
merger activity, such shuffling of holdings could severely hamper a labor union's
ability to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement for workers in fields where
layoffs and shutdowns are a reality of the industry. More troubling is the
opportunity for strategic behavior by corporations that shut down operations for the
express purpose of transferring work to a related non-union company. The next Part
deals with just that problem in the context of double-breasting.79
IV. DOUBLE-BREASTING
Although the UMWA successfully negotiated a proactive successorship
clause in the NBCWA of 1974 that protected the continuing employment rights of
its members80 in the event their mine was sold, miners still found themselves being
displaced as their employers shifted production arrangements from signatory
employer mine-operators to leased-mine or subcontracting arrangements. In such
cases, the signatory employer often decreased or ceased coal production at its
wholly owned mines, causing massive layoffs, and began "purchasing" coal mined
from its own reserves by nonsignatory lessees or subcontractors. Thus, it avoided
high union labor costs and was able to reap higher profits from the very same coal.
To address the loss ofjobs caused by this shift of both coal production and
labor away from the unionized mine to non-union operations, the Union in 1984
negotiated a work preservation clause requiring the signatory company to secure
from the leasing or subcontracting company its agreement to offer all available
classified-type employment to bargaining unit members.' This work preservation
language ensured that where signatory operations, which in some cases had been
Double-breasting is the practice of operating two companies, one union and one non-union,
to drain away the unionized employees into the non-union firm in an effort to reduce labor costs and
enhance management control.
79

80

Despite the use of the term "members," it is important to note that all bargaining unit

members are covered by the contract's work preservation provisions, regardless of their status as Union

members.
81

NBCWA of 1984, Article 1(h).
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shut down for years, were subcontracted to third parties, the miners would be
recalled to work. If the signatory company simply leased out coal reserves, rather
than the mining operation itself, the bargaining unit members would still be
protected against the dislocation that could occur as coal production shifted. 2
These provisions provided employment stability not only to the Union's members,
but also to the communities whose day-to-day commerce depend on the miners'
financial stability to fend off the ripple effect that had historically resulted in boom
and bust economic cycles in coal communities.
In the latter half of the 1980s, the coal fields saw an increasing number of
signatory coal companies opening non-union mines themselves rather than through
subcontracting or leasing, in effect engaging in double-breasting. Where a signatory
company had historically depended on coal production from its signatory mines to
fill its coal contracts, it now could draw from both its UMWA-represented
operations and non-union operations to meet its coal sale commitments. The
signatory company could shift production from its union mines to its non-union
mines, resulting in the shutdown of the union mines or their slower but inevitable
demise. As signatory companies directed new investment away from union
operations and into non-union operations, the unemployment rate for union miners
climbed ever upward. 3 The Union addressed this continuing assault on its
members in its negotiations with the Bituminous Coal Operator's Association
("BCOA") for the 1988 NBCWA.
When negotiations finally concluded in February, 1988, the BCOA had
agreed that the signatory companies would offer three out of five jobs of a classified
nature to its bargaining unit employees for jobs at their non-signatory mining
operations." While it did not protect the members against displacement from
UMWA-represented jobs, it at least provided those displaced members with the

82

Article 1(h)(2) of the NBCWA reads in part that
[I]easing, subleasing or licensing out of coal mining operations covered by this

Agreement shall be permitted where the lessee-licensee agrees that all offers of
employment by such lessee-licensee shall first be made (on the basis of mine
seniority) to the Employer's classified and laid-off Employees
NBCWA of 1984, Article 1(h). This language, slightly modified to require written notice to the
UMWA of such leasing arrangements, is now in Article 11(3) of the current (1998) NBCWA.
83

For information on climbing unemployment of union miners, see COAL COMMISSION

REPORT, A REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 11-12 (Nov. 1990)
[hereinafter COAL COMM. RPT.].
84

See NBCWA of 1988 at Art. II(A).
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opportunity to find work at the non-union mines to which their companies had
shifted coal production and labor.85
While the ink dried on the signatory companies' agreement to provide job
opportunities at their non-union mines, they devised a new scheme to avoid the
application of these work preservation provisions. During the term of the 1988
NBCWA, the Union saw new non-union mines opened not by signatory companies,
who would be subject to the three-out-five job offer program, but by their parent
companies or related subsidiary companies. Coal lands that had been held directly
by signatory companies were shifted to newly-created land-holding companies, and
then transferred to newly-created corporate entities for development of new mines.
Consequently, when the 1988 contract expired and negotiations for the successor
collective bargaining agreement began, the Union's top priority was to address this
corporate restructuring that had allowed signatory companies to evade their
promises under Article II of the NBCWA. Negotiations were difficult and the
UMWA engaged in a national strike against BCOA members companies for seven
months.86 Only after the appointment of former Secretary of Labor William Usery
as mediator were the parties able to make progress toward an agreement.87
Negotiations finally concluded with the Bituminous Coal Operators Association's
agreement that, as limited agents of their parent companies, they would agree that
signatories' parent companies would provide the same three-out-of-five job offer
program at the nonsignatory mines of their other subsidiaries and related companies
through a new agreement, the Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Job
Opportunities ("Jobs MOU").88
As described above, Article II of the NBCWA provides that if an employer
who is signatory to the contract opens or acquires an operation not covered by the
agreement, three out of five new hires will be from either the employer's laid-off
miners or its actively employed miners who have indicated an interest in transfer

85

See id.

86

Erle Norton, Miner's Union, Coal ProducersReach LaborAccord That Boosts Job Security,

WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 1993, at 5A.
87

Usery's PersistencePays Off, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Dec. 16, 1993 at 4A.

The Jobs MOU reads in part that BCOA members shall act as the limited agent for their
nonsignatory parents and its nonsignatory coal mining subsidiaries. Jobs MOU Preamble. The
companies promised that three out of five "job opportunities for work of a classified nature shall be
at existing, new, or newly acquired nonsignatory bituminous coal mining operations of the
nonsignatory Companies." Jobs MOU at 1.
88
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to the new operation.89 This provision also applies to lessees or licensees of the
signatory employer, requiring lessees to hire all of its classified workers from the
panel system." The Jobs MOU extends the three-out-of-five hiring provisions of
Article II to the signatories' parent companies and to any of the parent's
nonsignatory at the bituminous coal mining operations at which the nonsignatory
company has fifty percent or more ownership or at which it has the exclusive right
to control hiring. The purpose of the Jobs MOU was to close the gap in Article II's
coverage that had been created by the corporate restructuring undertaken during the
term of the 1984 NBCWA.
Article II and the Jobs MOU have operated to provide some miners with
work, even though it is not under a UMWA contract. However, disputes under
these two contractual provisions indicate that despite employers' promises and the
clear intent of these provisions, some companies will engage in transactions and
create business structures that, though they arguably comply with the letter of the
agreement, are structured with the intent of avoiding the job promises of Article II
and the Jobs MOU.
One recent case heard before the Jobs Monitor9' illustrates an example of
how by subordinating function to formality, companies may still attempt to evade
their promises to hire laid off bargaining unit employees. In mid-August, 1994, just
a few months after signing the Jobs MOU, Peabody Holding Company, the
nonsignatory parent of Peabody Coal Company, formed a new nonsignatory
company, Thoroughbred.92 Through a series of intra-corporate transactions,
Peabody Holding transferred its ownership in coal holdings in southern Indiana that
had historically been mined by a UMWA-represented bargaining unit to this
nonsignatory subsidiary.93 At the time the Jobs MOU was entered into, these coal
lands were held by a Peabody Holding subsidiary, Premier Coal Company, and
Peabody Holding had expressly recognized, in communications with the Union, that
any mining operation created on those reserves would be subject to the Jobs MOU.
Nevertheless, by August, 1994, the permit to those reserves that were held by

89

NBCWA of 1988, Article II.

90

Id.

The Jobs Monitor is the designated national arbitrator of disputes that arise under Article II
and the MOU.

91

See In re: Black Beauty Coal Company/The Pittsburgh & Midway Coal
Company/Thoroughbred (Peabody), L.C.C. Transaction at 6 (June 1, 1997) (arbitration before the
UMWA-BCOA Labor Management Policy Committee, William J. Usery, Chair) (on file with authors).
92

93

Id. at 7.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol100/iss3/5

20

Crandall et al.: Hiding behind the Corporate Veil: Employer Abuse of the Corporate

19983

EMPLOYER ABUSE OF THE CORPORATE FORM

Premier were transferred to Thoroughbred. Thoroughbred then contributed these
coal lands in exchange for a one-third ownership in a newly formed venture with
the Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Company, another UMWA signatory company
subject to both Article II and the Jobs MOU, and a nonsignatory company, Black
Beauty Resources.94 The right to hire was delegated, by agreement of the new
partnership, to a management committee?5 Thus, by converting its interest in these
coal reserves into a one-third stake in a partnership - reserves in which it had a
100% interest - Peabody was trying to shed the promise ofjobs it had made to its
unemployed miners while still reaping all its projected profits from the coal.
Within days after learning of the restructuring through company press
releases, the Union brought the dispute before the Jobs Monitor, asserting that the
companies had wrongfully restructured for the purpose of avoiding the application
of the Jobs MOU. On June 1, 1997, Usery issued an arbitration award finding
Peabody Holding Company liable for restructuring its ownership of its coal reserves
and resulting mining operation to evade the application of the Jobs MOU. The
matter is presently in litigation in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Indiana. 6
The Peabody case illustrates the ease with which coal companies will
expressly promise the Union, in an effort to reach a contract and end a strike, that
these pivotal concerns over the erosion of union work will be met with job
opportunities at the new non-union mining operations, only to then restructure
themselves so that their new mining operations will not be covered by those
promises. From the perspective of an out-of-work miner, these sorts of transactions
can be seen as nothing more than slick, calculated attempts by companies to avoid
their contractual promises so they can widen profit margins at the expense of their
loyal employees.
V. CONTRACTING OUT

Another increasingly common strategy used by coal companies to insulate
themselves from employee-related liabilities is subcontracting. In this strategy,

94

Id.

95

Id.

96

Thoroughbred, L.C.C. v. UMWA, Civ. No. EV 97-99-C-D/H (S.D. Ind. 1997); Peabody

Holding Co., Inc. v. UMWA, Civ. No. EV-97-155-C-H/IH (S.D. Ind. 1997).
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sometimes known as the "Massey Doctrine," 7 coal companies limit their own
exposure and maximize profits by mining larger, more profitable seams of coal
themselves, and contracting out smaller, thinner seams (which are more expensive
to mine) to independent operators. As one commentator has explained,
"Contracting is a one-sided relationship. Big companies own the coal. They sell
the coal. And they decide how much they will pay contractors, who actually mine
the coal.""8 Even the BCOA has admitted that such arrangements are designed to
avoid paying employee benefits: "Look around in corporate America at what people
are doing to avoid healthcare and other payments. They're contracting out work.
That's the whole point of using contractors."9 9
UMWA Local 7555 member Christopher Hurley has experienced firsthand
the impact of contract mining, both as an employee and as an ex-employee. He

started working for Island Creek in 1977, was laid off in 1981, and since then has
worked for seventeen different contractors at twenty-five different mines in the Elk
Most recently, he was caught up in a contractor
Creek/Coal Mountain area.'
failure when Shield Mining, Inc., his employer, lost its contract with Island Creek

and abruptly shut down in March, 1997. The company had been in business less
than a year, and had never fully paid its wage bond, its workers compensation
insurance premiums, and its health insurance.'0 ' In fact, it had relied on Island

Creek to finance and loan it equipment such as a continuous miner, belt heads, and
belt lines as well as a series of advances in order to meet payroll and other operating
expenses. When disputes arose over repayment terms, tonnage rates and reject
See Paul Nyden, Who Owes?, SUNDAY GAZETTE-MAIL, October 1, 1995 at IB [hereinafter
Who Owes?]; Paul Nyden, Communities Form,Fadewith Coal Ventures, CHARLESTON GAZEITE, Nov.
8, 1993, at 1, 6A [hereinafter Communities].
97

98

Communities, supra note 97; see also Paul Nyden, ContractingOut: What Price?, 105

4-9 (July 1994) [hereinafter ContractingOut]. The Gazette article
was the first in a series of articles published in the CharlestonGazette between November, 1993 and
January, 1994, entitled Coalfield Contracts:Mining at What Price?,which examined the trend toward
shifting liability and responsibility by contracting out coal mining work. The series was excerpted in
the UMWA Journalas Paul Nyden, ContractingOut: What Price?, 105 UnitedMine Workers Journal
4-9 (July 1994). Unless noted, all references herein are to the Journal version rather than to the
original.
UNITED MINE WORKERS JOURNAL

99

ContractingOut, supra note 98, at 5 (quoting BCOA spokesman Thomas F. Hoffman).

100

Deposition of Christopher Hurley at 6-8, Island Creek v. UMWA, Civ. Act. No. 2:97-0268

(S.D. W. Va.filed Mar. 19, 1994) (deposition dated Oct. 14, 1997) (on file with authors).
101

Deposition of Patrick Workman at 98-118, Island Creek, Civ. Act. No. 2:97-0268

(deposition dated Oct. 16, 1997) (on file with authors); see also Letter from Daniel L. Stickler (March
25, 1997) (on file with authors); Affidavit of Joe Berry (March 18, 1997) (on file with authors).
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rates, Island Creek simply pulled the plug and ejected Shield from the property.

Even more problematic, Island Creek refused to pay over $80,000 to Shield for its
last coal shipment, which in turn meant that Shield was unable to pay Hurley and

his co-workers their final paychecks.' °2
When the workers protested on the road leading to the mine, Island Creek
expelled five of the protestors from its panel, including Hurley. 3 It also sued the
Local, District, and International Unions in both federal and state courts, alleging
a variety of claims, chiefly that the protest constituted a secondary boycott, and that

the union had somehow tortiously interfered with its business.'" For its part, Shield
filed for bankruptcy, listing its debts as over a million dollars, of which it owed
$555,000 to Island Creek and another $127,511 to its hourly workers. 5 In turn, the
employees filed a mechanics lien and a state court action against Island Creek under
West Virginia's "prime contractor"'0 6 and mechanic's lien statutes,'0 7 claiming
unpaid wages, liquidated damages, benefits, and unpaid union dues and

Deposition of Patrick Workman at 98-118, Island Creek, Civ. Act. No. 2:97-0268; see also
Stickler, supra note 101; Complaint and Motion to Dismiss, Island Creek No.2:97-0268 (secondary
boycott case); Amended Counterclaim, Island Creek Coal Co. v. District 17, No. 97-C-96-O (Logan
County Cir. Ct. filed Oct. 28, 1997) (action seeking injunction and damages for tortious interference
and counterclaim for wages and damages and to enforce mechanics lien). Island Creek also filed
NLRB charges against the Union, N.L.1B. Case No. 9-CC-1589, which were dismissed. See Stickler,
supra note 101.
102

See Memorandum Opinion, UMWA District 17 v. Island Creek, No. 2:97-0690, slip. op. at
4-5 (S.D. W. Va. Feb. 6, 1998). All five employees, including Hurley, filed grievances challenging
the expulsions, and three were reinstated in decisions by two separate arbitrators. However, a third
arbitrator disagreed with the other two and refused to reinstate Hurley. See id. As a result, UMWA
District 17 filed yet another action in federal court, this time to vacate the arbitration decision, which
it lost, and which is now on appeal. See id(Notice Of Appeal filed on February 6, 1998). For Hurley,
this loss may well result in the loss of his ability to earn a UMWA pension and health card, since he
may well never be rehired by a signatory company unless he is reinstated to Island Creek's panel.
103

104

Complaint and Motion to Dismiss, Island Creek v. UMWA International, District 17,

No.2:97-0268; Amended Counterclaim, Island Creek CoalCo. v. District17, No. 97-C-96-O; In Re

Shield Mining, Inc., No. 97-20411 (Bankr. S.D. W. Va. filed March 22, 1997) (summary of bankruptcy
schedules).
105

In Re Shield Mining, Inc., No. 97-2041.

106

See W. VA. CODE

107

See W. VA. CODE § 38-2-32 (1997).

§ 21-5-7 (1996).
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The wage claims totaled over $314,000,"° while the amount posted

as a wage bond was only $59,300.1
Sadly, Hurley had been through this more than once. His previous
employer, another Island Creek contract miner on the same property named Elk
Creek Blue Eagle, had also gone out of business."' Mutual Mining, Inc.("Mutual"),

yet another contractor who had operated a surface mine on Island Creek's property
from 1988, went belly-up in 1995 under very similar circumstances. At the time of

its shutdown, Mutual owed its workers thousands of dollars in wages, health
insurance payments, union dues and assessments, grievance settlements, and other
ordered by the NLRB."' UMWA District 17 sued it and its lessors, Island Creek

Coal Company, Island Creek Corporation, Consol, Inc., Laurel Run Mining
Company, and three individual owners, and won a summary judgment that all four
benefits, liquidated damages,
corporate defendants were liable for the wages, fringe
3
fees."
attorney
and
costs,
interest,
prejudgement
Although the limited legal victories in these cases may be unusual, Hurley's
experiences are not. Contract mining arrangements accounted for over forty-two

percent of all coal mined in southern West Virginia and surrounding regions in
1991."' Island Creek and A.T. Massey are by far the heaviest subcontractors,

108

Amended Counterclaim, Island Creek Coal Co. v. District 17, No. 97-C-96-O.

109

That sum, attached to a Proof of Claim, is based on the plaintiff's mechanic's lien and a

Division of Labor audit attached thereto. See Mechanics Lien, In Re Shield Mining, Inc., No 9720411.
110

Id.; Stickler, supra note 101.

III

Deposition of Christopher Hurley at 6-8, Island Creek v. UMWA, No. 2:97-0268 (S.D. W.

Va. filed Mar. 19, 1994) (deposition dated Oct. 14, 1997) (on file with authors).
See, e.g., Decision and Order, Taylor v. Mutual Mining, Inc., No. 95-C-409P (Logan County
Cir. Ct. Nov. 14, 1997); Mutual Mining, Inc., 322 N.L.R.B. 432 (1996) (ordering reinstatement and
back pay dating back to 1992, as well as health insurance, union dues, and grievance payments);
Dotson v. Mutual Mining, Inc., Nos. 93-C-409, 96-C-71 (Logan County Cir. Ct. July 15, 1997)
(awarding trucker over $20,000 in wages and damages against Island Creek). However, it could not
be confirmed whether and when any of these employees actually received the damages awarded.
112

113

Taylor v. Mutual Mining, Inc., No. 95-C-409P (awarding summary judgment to plaintiff

employees); Dotson,Nos. 93-C-409, 96-C-71 (same).
114

Paul Nyden, Living Up to Coal Contracts,SUNDAY GAZETrE-MAIL, Nov. 7, 1993, at 16A;

see also ContractingOut, supranote 98, at 5.
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although Arch has been increasing its reliance on them as well in recent years." 5
Four years ago, the CharlestonGazette reported that Island Creek and Massey had

alone hired more than 725 different contractors in Appalachia in the last two
decades." 6 Massey itself had used nearly 500 contractors since 1986, including 247

in West Virginia and 176 in Kentucky, while Island Creek hired at least 250
contractors, including 177 in West Virginia and eighty-four in Kentucky."' In 1993
Massey was employing subcontractors at twenty-eight mines, and operating only

twenty-two mines with its own labor."'
In the typical scenario, a large coal company owns all coal rights, permits,

and access to the mine, and requires that all the coal produced be sold back to it at
a set price, and cleaned at its own preparation plant." 9 The coal owner/lessor
provides all necessary mining plans, engineering and reclamation services (for

which it may charge, directly or indirectly). It also maintains and provides the
portal, bathhouse, electricity, and property improvements, as well as all coal leases,
access rights, and permits. It often provides all or some of the equipment to be used
by the contractor and/or installed in the mine, either loaned, sold or financed. If the

owner/lessor is itself a union signatory, it may require that the contractor hire from
a "panel" of UMWA miners laid off by itself or by a previous contractor, and

115

Nyden, supra note 114.

116

ContractingOut, supra note 98, at 6.

117

Id.

118

Id. Since then, these numbers have apparently decreased, according to UMWA Research

Director Michael Buckner. See COAL DATA RESEARCH

SERVICE1RESOURCE DATA INTERNATIONAL,

INC., SUMMARY OF DATA (on file with authors).
ContractingOut, supranote 98, at 7; Nyden, supranote 114 (listing items); see also Mining
Agreement Between Island Creek and Shield Mining, Inc. (Feb. 15, 1996) (on file with author). The
Mining Agreement cited above is a fairly typical example. It provides that, inter alia,"Contractor shall
be responsible in all respects for the hiring, employment and working conditions of all individuals
engaged to carry on the activities and operations herein contemplated." Id at 3. Shield also promised
to hire from Island Creek's panel, to pay union-scale wages and benefits, to maintain workers
compensation and other insurance, to post a wage bond, pay all pension and other contributions, to
comply with all environmental, permitting, safety and reclamation requirements, to pay all employeerelated fees and taxes, and to "hold harmless, indemnify and defend" Island Creek for any and all
liability, grievances, penalties, or other costs it may be ordered to pay. Id. Any failure to perform any
of these obligations is grounds for termination. See id. at 3, 4, 13, 16, 18, 20, 21-23.
119
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demand that it pay Union-scale wages and benefits. 20 At the same time, the
owner/lessor retains the rights to reduce or adjust the price it will pay per ton of raw
or clean coal, to determine the reject rate, to control how, when, and where coal is
to be delivered, and even to cancel the entire arrangement at will. In sum, while
such arrangements are normally considered arms' length contracts between equals,
the reality in the coal fields is that the lessor/landowner/coal purchaser obviously
retains much more leverage and bears much less risk than the small mine operator.
The risks the coal owners and/or lessors geek to transfer by these
arrangements include numerous obligations toward the workers who actually mine
the coal, as well as to the UMWA and the Funds' and to state and federal
regulators. As one commentator explained, "Depending on specific circumstances,
a large company can shift between $3 and $5 [in costs] for each ton of coal mined
from its shoulders onto the small mine operator or society at large."'" Operators
often seek to "offload" contractual and statutory obligations ranging from wages
and vacation payments, health insurance premiums, and pension contributions to
statutory obligations such as workers compensation taxes, unemployment and
Social Security contributions, federal and state black lung liabilities, hearing loss
compensation premiums, health and safety requirements, and reclamation costs.I2
Finally, the scheme can relieve the large operator of long-term obligations
as well. For example, since 1987, Island Creek's contractors have been forced to
hire from Island Creek's own "panels"' 24 of laid off workers, and to pay union-scale
wages and benefits, under various agreements with the UMWA." As a result,
those contractors then become the workers' "last signatory operator," under both

See, e.g., NBCWA of 1993 Articles II, IV, and XX (on file with authors). For example, the
NBCWA requires that signatory employers provide medical insurance for all active employees, a year's
additional coverage for laid off employees with seniority, and lifetime coverage for retirees. Article
II also requires that operators require their contractors to offer these same benefits. Id.
120

121

See COAL COMM. RPT., supra note 83, at 15-29.

122

Nyden, supra note 98, at 6-7 (quoting environmental attorney L. Thomas Galloway).

123

Id. at 7; Nyden, supra note 114 (listing items).

124

The "panels" are the company's recall lists under the NBCWA, Article XVII.

See Paul Nyden, Joint Contract Mining Venture Yields Legal Problems, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE, Nov. 9, 1993, at IA (explaining history of UMWA-Island Creek Employment and Economic
Security Pact ("EESP") of 1987). The EESP, like the JOBS MOU discussed in Part III above, was
intended to increase employment for union workers and bar Island Creek from replacing them with
non-union contractors paying substandard wages and benefits, as in the Black Beauty case outlined
above. See supranotes 92-96 and accompanying text.
125
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the NBCWA and the Coal Act,'26 and must provide the worker (and her or his
spouse) with lifetime health insurance when the worker retires, and/or must pay
substantial withdrawal liability and/or Coal Act premiums to the funds. The ironic
result of such provisions is that the small operator thus succeeds to health care
obligations that might otherwise have remained with Island Creek. As a result,
when subcontractor Jagged Coal Inc. hired UMWA member Wayne Williamson,
it relieved Island Creek of its duties as Williamson's "last signatory employer" and
shifted responsibility for his lifetime health care costs to Jagged. Williamson
explained, "When I worked one shift for Jagged, that got Island Creek out of giving
me a hospital card, even though I worked for them for 19 years and I was already
injured. When companies get a man in his 40s, they know he's not going to last
much longer, maybe 15 years. So they get him off on a contractor."'2 7
The bills associated with operating a coal mine can be overwhelming,
especially for a small operator. One indicator of these costs is the sheer number of
West Virginia contractors who have filed for bankruptcy or simply left town and
defaulted on their financial obligations. The attrition rate for these contractors is
staggering. Of those identified by the Charleston Gazette in 1993,12' more than
eighty percent had disappeared and seventy-five had filed for bankruptcy, including
fifty-two of the sixty companies who had mined coal for Island Creek on and around
Elk Creek and Holden, West Virginia.'29 In so doing, they collectively left behind
over $200 million in unpaid debts: more than thirty million dollars owed to the
West Virginia Workers' Compensation Fund, at least thirty million dollars to the
UMWA Health and Retirement Funds, nearly eight million dollars in state
environmental fines, $665,000 in safety fines, and "tens of millions of dollars in
unpaid taxes."'"3 Since that time, of course, some of those monies may have been
collected, but even more contractors have gone under.'' For example, Paul Nyden
126

See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 9701-22 (1994).

127

See Nyden, supra note 125.

128

See Communities, supra note 97.

129

See id. at 6A.

130

Nyden, supra note 114, at 16A.

131

For example, Eagle Delta, whose owner Ben Beverly was featured in Nyden's series in the

Gazette, had been operating under Chapter 11 protection since September, 1992. See Nyden, supra
note 97, at 6A. According to the Gazette and the company's own bankruptcy filings, Eagle Delta owed
$2.2 million to the UMWA Funds and $727,000 to the West Virginia Workers Compensation Fund
when it filed for Chapter 11. Its efforts at reorganization ultimately failed and its bankruptcy case was
converted to Chapter Seven liquidation. The trustees' final report listed its available cash as $5,370.00,
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reported in 1995 that 1,200 scofflaw contractors had gone out of business, owing
at least twenty million dollars to the state Workers Compensation Fund.'32 As the
Sunday Gazette-Mail has stated, "It should be a crime when.., companies dodge
their responsibilities by shifting them onto small contractors. Such practices cost
taxpayers and more responsible businesses millions of dollars."'3 By 1997, not
much had changed: encouraging the state to sue more such scofflaws, the Gazette
commented that "Big coal owners who shift their obligations onto fly-by-night
contractors have cost West Virginia hundreds of millions of dollars in Workers'
costs.... It's time to
Comp premiums, unpaid health benefits, and environmental
134
bag."'
the
holding
others
leaves
that
halt this charade
Even more disturbing than the enormous bills which these small contractors
leave behind are the allegations that their lessors not only acquiesced in their
defaults, but at least in some cases, pressured or encouraged them to file for
bankruptcy and walk away from their obligations. Nyden reports that at least a
dozen contractors have sued either Island Creek or Massey in the last six years,
claiming breach of contract, price gouging, mismanagement, misrepresentation and
fraud - such as the claim by Jagged Coal that "Island Creek's shifting of liability
135
[for employee and retiree health care obligations] amounted to actual fraud."'
Other suits have alleged that the companies advanced them large sums of money,
kept them afloat for a year or two, then began "squeezing" them by reducing the
prices paid for coal, refusing to pay for deliveries and claiming unreasonable
"reject" rates and withholding their payments, often the only source of operating
capital. For example, Nyden reviewed a three-foot-tall stack of bankruptcy
and its debts as over six million dollars. After five years of litigation, neither Eagle Delta's employees,
the pension and health care funds, the state Workers' Compensation Fund, the Union, Blue Cross, or
most other creditors received any of what they were owed, either from Eagle Delta itself or from Island
Creek. Trustees Final Report and Proposed Distribution, In re Eagle Delta Corp., Inc., No. 92-20825
(Bankr. S.D. W. Va.Feb. 18, 1997) (on file with authors).
Who Owes?, supranote 97, at lB. As Nyden reports, many of these contractors worked for
Massey and other large companies, but it is unclear whether the state can force Massey to pay their
debts. Id. at 1B, 4B. The Workers Compensation Fund did file a lawsuit in late 1996 against Island
Creek and two other large coal companies in an effort to claim $12.6 million that the contractors owed
to the Fund. Donors Owe Workers Comp Fund; Coal OperatorsHeavily Funded Underwood, Who
Called offSuits, CHARLESTON GAZET=E, Dec. 31, 1997 at IC.
132

133

Dan Radmacher, ContractDeaths, SUNDAY GAZETtE-MAIL, Jan. 2, 1994 at 4B (editorial).

134

Dan Radmacher, Contractors: Who Pays $2.6 Million?, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, June 6,

1997, at 4A (editorial).
See Nyden, supranote 114, at 16A. Plaintiffs in these cases have included Rick Abraham,
135
PayBra Mining, Jagged Coal Inc., ENI, Electric Fuels Corp., Shield Mining, and others. Id.
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documents filed in a single case, involving Island Creek contractor Phillips Coal
and seven affiliated companies. According to an accountant hired by the court, "the
initial assets of Phillips Coal primarily consisted of advances made by Island Creek
for start-up of the mine.... Most of the equipment used by Phillips Coal was either
leased or otherwise provided by Island Creek." '36 Phillips was more than twentyfive million dollars in debt when it filed for bankruptcy; needless to say, Island
Creek was not responsible for any of those debts, even though it had cashed in all
of Phillips' coal.'37
This example suggests one reason for the high failure rate: Island Creek's
decision to contract with an undercapitalized, inexperienced contractor. Surely
Island Creek could correct this error if it chose to do so. However, contractors like
Phillips and others interviewed by Nyden believe that Island Creek intentionally
forced them out of business so that it could sell its property to someone else and/or
38
contract it out all over again.
Other cases reveal similar problems. For example, the creator of the
infamous "Massey Doctrine" has admitted that Massey knows that the contract
miners it hires on its least profitable reserves cannot survive:
[O]n poor, substandard coal reserves, it is impossible for a
company to exist ...they are certainly not going to make any
money on it,... but there is still a lot of coal that is produced from
these submarginal quality coal seams.... [A]ll that [we] can do is
simply to purchase or to broker that coal if it's to [our] advantage
9
13

to do so.

Indeed, some observers, including some ex-Massey contractors, have claimed that
the company deliberately recruits and creates small contractors to mine its marginal
coal, advances them just enough money to open a small mine, then takes out its
repayment (and equipment rental or lease payments, etc.) from the monthly amounts
it would otherwise pay for the coal. After enough coal has been mined, and the

136

Paul Nyden, High Rolling Coal Success Story Ends in $25.8 Million Bankruptcy,

CHARLESTON GAZETTE,
137

Id.

138

Id.

Nov. 10, 1993 at IA, 6A.

139
See, e.g., Transcript of Trial (vol. 14) at 43, Marrowbone Development Co. v. UMWA Int'l
Union, Civ. No. 81-3332, (S.D. W. Va. Feb. 18-19, 1987) (testimony of E. Morgan Massey) (on file
with authors); see also Who Owes?, supra note 97, at 1B (describing "Massey Coal Company
Doctrine," circa 1983, and "Massey Strategic and Operating Plan,"circa July 1990).
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contractor begins to complain too loudly, Massey encourages it to declare
bankruptcy or to simply stop doing business. Alternatively, Massey may simply
cancel the contract and withhold any final payments due, leaving the contractor
unable to make his last payroll, let alone pay his accumulated liabilities as outlined
above.
In the end, Massey gets to sell the coal at a profit, keep its rights to any
remaining reserves, and walk away with a tax write-off for a bad debt, free to start
over again with a new contractor, or perhaps even the same one under a new
name. 4 For his part, the middleman can also walk away from his obligations with
impunity, because he owns neither the land, the equipment, the permit, nor any of
the profits. Even -the property owner disclaims responsibility for the illegal acts that
were committed on his behalf. Instead, the ones who pay the price for these failures
are taxpayers and legitimate businesses, as well as the miners, who may lose not
only their wages but also their health insurance coverage, recall rights, and other
benefits. 4 ' Recovery of these debts is made even more difficult by the fact that the
severed coal, the major asset produced by their labor, has been effectively sold off,
beyond the reach of the workers and other claimants. Regardless of the legality of
such arrangements, the bottom line is that employers should not be permitted to
insulate themselves from the consequences of their enterprises, at the expense of the
employees who make the enterprise productive. Since Biblical times, our laws have
recognized that those who profit from a laborer's toil must pay the laborer his
42

due. 1

In recent years, West Virginia courts have begun to agree. This basic right
has been codified in the West Virginia Wage Payment and Collection Act
("WPCA")1 41 The wage bond requirements, mechanics' lien provisions 144 "prime
140

See, e.g., Grant Crandall, Memorandum of Law (Jan. 11, 1998); Susan Rosshirt,

Memorandum of Law (Dec. 12, 1990) (detailing cases of Massey/Rum Creek contractors Rock Run
Mining, TNT Mining, Guyan Resources, Dynasty Mine, and Berachach) (on file with authors).
141

And, of course, the state and federal governments, taxpayers, and the UMWA Funds, who

are left holding the bag for workers compensation, unemployment, and retirement benefits respectively
despite the ex-employer's failure to make contributions.
142

Thou shall not oppress a hired servant that is poor and needy, whether he be of thy
brethren, or of the strangers that are in thy land within thy gates. In the same day,
thou shalt give him his hire, neither shall the sun go down upon it; for he is poor
and setteth his heart upon it
Deuteronomy 24:14-15.
143

For a detailed discussion of the act and these various provisions from an employer

perspective, see Elizabeth D. Harter, Payingthe Price ofJudicialActivism Under the Wage Payment
and CollectionAct, 96 W. VA. L. REv. 743 (1993); see also Rowe v. Grapevine Corp., 456 S.E.2d 1

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol100/iss3/5

30

Crandall et al.: Hiding behind the Corporate Veil: Employer Abuse of the Corporate
1998]

EMPLOYER ABUSE OF THE CORPORATE FORM

contractor" liability 4 ' and damages provisions 4 6 developed under this Act have
helped in some instances to tip the scale back toward holding the mine owner/lessor
(a.k.a. the "parent" company) responsible for the obligations owed to coal miners
and to government agencies when fly-by-night contractors disappear.
Taken as a whole, these provisions represent an attempt to prevent such
abuses and hold owner-operators liable for violating contract workers' rights, even
if the "employer" itself has disappeared, filed for bankruptcy, or is otherwise
judgment proof. Through a series of cases, the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals has adopted a broad, reality-based definition of employer under the WPCA
which looks beyond contractual relationships to examine the actual relationship
between the parties, the employee, and the third party.'47 As the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals has explained, the WPCA embodies "an important
public policy" that
requires employers to pay the wages of working people who labor
on their employer's behalf. Wages have traditionally been
afforded special protection under the law, in recognition of the fact
that working people depend on wages to furnish the basic
necessities of life to themselves and their families. 4
In brief, the WPCA accomplishes this by defining "employee" as "any person
suffered orpermittedto work by a person, firm or corporation,' ' 149 and "employer"
as "any person, firm or corporation employing any employee."''5 Thus, logically

(W.Va. 1995).
144

See W. VA. CODE § 38-2-31 to -39 (1997); Dunlap v. Hinkle, 317 S.E.2d 508 (W. Va. 1984).

145

See W. VA. CODE § 21-5-7 to -18 (1996); Mullins v. Venable, 297 S.E.2d 866 (W. Va.
1982); Farley v. Zapata Coal Corp., 281 S.E.2d 238 (W. Va. 1981).
146

See W. VA. CODE § 21-5-4(e) (1997); see also, e.g., Farley,281 S.E.2d 238.

147

See Amick v. C & T Dev. Co., Inc., 416 S.E.2d 73 (W. Va. 1992); Goodwin v. Willard, 406

S.E.2d 752, 755 (W. Va. 1991); Mullins, 297 S.E.2d at 871; Farley,281 S.E.2d 238.
148

Mullins, 297 S.E.2d at 871 (citations omitted).

149

W. VA. CODE § 21-5-1(b) (1996) (emphasis added).

150

W. VA. CODE

§ 21-5-1(m) (1996).
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restated, the statute broadens the definition of "employer" as anyone who "suffers
or permits" anyone else to perform work.
In a series of landmark cases, West Virginia courts have held that this
language can encompass not only the mine operator but its "parent" contractor, its
individual owners, joint employers, and real property owner, and that each can be
held liable for certain debts left by their coal mine subcontractors, depending on the
facts of the case. One particularly powerful section of the WPCA is the "Prime
Contractor Statute,"'' which was specifically written to ensure that those who are
involved in and have profited from an enterprise are held responsible for paying
employees' wages. In pertinent part, it provides that
[w]henever any person, firm or corporation shall contract with
another for the performance of any work which the prime
contracting person has undertaken to perform for another, the
prime contractor shall become civilly liable to employees engaged
in the performance of work under such contract for the payment of
wages and fringe benefits, exclusive of liquidated damages.., to
the extent that the employer of such employee fails to pay such
wages and fringe benefits...152
Therefore, depending on whether it played an active role in the enterprise
and to the extent that it was the direct beneficiary of the plaintiffs labors, an owner
and/or lessor may be held accountable for wages unpaid by its contractor, even
though the two are nominally distinct corporate entities. Although the WPCA does
not cover all unpaid debts and certainly does not fully correct the abuses cited
above, it is better than no remedy at all. Nonetheless, it is one which most
individual coal miners cannot afford to litigate on their own, without the help of a
union or the state Labor Commissioner.'53 Thus, many subcontractors and their

151

See W. VA. CODE § 21-5-7 (1996).

152

Id See, e.g., Rowe v. Grapevine Corp., 456 S.E.2d I (W. Va. 1995) (holding that individual

landowners are joint employers with "labor brokers" who recruit foreign workers to pick their crops);
Goodwin, 406 S.E.2d at 755-57 (holding so-called "passive investor" personally liable as agent of
defunct employer under WPCA because owner played an active role in the day-to-day operation of the
mine). See also Mullins, 297 S.E.2d at 869 (holding corporate officers liable under WPCA); Farley,
281 S.E.2d 238 (allowing mechanic's lien actions against mine owners under WPCA).
153

The WPCA charges the Labor Commissioner with administration and enforcement of the

Wage Act. See Harter, supranote 143, at 756-58.
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wages uncollected, simply
prime contractors continue to go unpunished and many
54
cases.
the
litigating
of
difficulty
because of the sheer
In contrast to the expansive definition of "employer" under West Virginia
law, the NLRB has traditionally taken a much narrower view in interpreting the
same term under the NLRA. Section 2(2) of that law defines the term "employer"
as including "any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly,"
but does not further define the term.' 55 As a result, the NLRB has developed (and

federal courts have approved) a number of indicia to determine "employer" identity,
focusing on whether the entity has the right of control over essential terms and
conditions of employment, such as hiring, firing, supervision, wages, and hours.' 56
However, instead of simply applying a single definition, as the West
Virginia courts have done, the Board has developed at least six distinct tests or
analytical frameworks for use in varying factual scenarios. Among these are "joint
60
159
5
employers,"' 157 "single employer,"' "alter ego,"' "piercing the corporate veil,"'
154

For example, remedies against a contractor, prime contractor, or landowner under the WPCA

can only be enforced by individual employees, and only in state court, where contractors can easily
avoid such lawsuits by filing for bankruptcy, which offers an "automatic stay" of all lawsuits. See II
U.S.C. § 362 (1994). In addition, the West Virginia Department of Labor has its own auditing and
administrative process. Meanwhile, unions can normally only sue (or be sued) to enforce collective
bargaining agreements infederal court under Labor Management Relations Act, § 301, 29 U.S.C. §
185 (1988), and employers in tum can only sue unions in federal court under either Labor Management
Relation Act, §§ 301 or 303, 29 U.S.C. §§ 185 or 187 (1988). Thus, the failure of a single contractor
such as Shield can spawn a bewildering array of litigation, not to mention enormous legal fees, just to
get payment for an individual worker. This is a system only a lawyer could love.
155

See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1988).

156

This broad, functional definition was developed in a case involving security guards who had

been "militarized" during World War II. N.L.R.B. v. E.C. Atkins & Co., 331 U.S. 398 (1947). The
question was whether the guards were still "employees" under the act, and if so who was their
"employer." The Atkins court acknowledged that the NLRA's definition was vague, declaring that
Congress had effectively granted wide discretion to the NLRB to define and apply the term. It then
explained that
the terms "employer" and "employee" in [the NLRA] carry with them more than
the technical and traditional common law definitions. They also draw substance
from the policy and purposes of the Act, the circumstances and background of
particular employment relationships, and all the hard facts of industrial life, ... [as
well as] an appreciation of economic realities, [and] the more relevant economic
and statutory considerations.
Id.
157
For a clear and comprehensive explanation of these often overlapping standards and the
subtle differences between alter egos, single employers, and joint employers, see Walter V. Siebert &
N. Dawn Webber, JointEmployer, Single Employer andAlter Ego, THE LABOR LAWYER 873 (1987);
THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 25, 738-46. Some useful suggestions for reforming and
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and the "ally" doctrine,'61 in addition to the "successorship" doctrine.'62 Although
each is applied somewhat differently, all of these tests essentially seek to evaluate
whether and to what extent two nominally separate entities, such as a contract miner
and its "parent" contractor," actually function as a single entity, or whether they

collapsing some of these categories can be found in Craig Becker, The ChangingWorkplace: Labor
Law Outside the Employment Relation, 74 TEX. L. REv. 1527, 1538-61 (1996); Larry Englestein,
LaborLaw for ContractEmployees: A Modest Reform Agenda, 48 CONTEIW. ISSUES INLAB. & EMP.
L. 319, 333-42 (1996); Stephen F. Befort, LaborLaw and the Double-BreastedEmployer: A Critique
ofthe Single Employer andAlter Ego Doctrines anda ProposedReformulation, 1987 WIsc. L. REV.

67, 101-05.
158

See, e.g., Pathology Institute, 329 N.L.R.B. 1050, 1051 (1996). In PathologyInstitute, the

Board held that Alta Bates Medical Center and Corporation became a single employer with Pathology
Institute when it purchased the hospital, and therefore must honor its preexisting collective bargaining
agreement. Id The Ninth Circuit affirmed, see Alta Bates v. N.L.R.B., 116 F.3d 482 (9th Cir. 1997),
and the Supreme Court declined the hospital's petition for certiorari.See Alta Bates v. N.L.R.B., 118
S. Ct. 625 (1997). Cf A.T. Massey Coal Co. v. UMWA, 799 F.2d 142 (1986).
159
See, e.g., Mining Specialists, Inc., 314 N.L.R.B. 268 (1994). In Mining Specialists, the
Board held that two putatively separate mining companies owned by the same family were alter egos
of one another, and ordered the "new" company to honor the existing UMWA collective bargaining
agreement. See id.; Alkire v. N.L.R.B., 716 F.2d 1014 (4th Cir. 1983) (affirming decision that
successor company was alter ego of predecessor).
160

See, e.g., White Oak Coal Co., Inc., 318 N.L.R.B. 732 (1995), enforced N.L.R.B. v. White

Oak Coal Co., Inc., 81 F.3d 150 (4th Cir. 1996); Denart Coal Co., Inc., 315 N.L.R.B. 850 (1994),
enforcedVance v. N.L.R.B., 71 F.3d 486 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding both that two companies and sole
proprietorship were single employers, and that owners were individually liable for unfair labor
practices).
See, e.g., Ramar Coal Co., Inc. v. United Mine Workers of America, 814 F. Supp. 502 (W.D.
Va. 1993).
161

162

See generally supranotes 63-79 and accompanying text and supra note 157.

163
Some commentators refer to this party as the "user employer" or the "client" employer.
These tests also apply to subsidiary-parent relationships, to "sister" subsidiaries or divisions of a single
company, or two entirely separate companies, depending on the facts and issues involved. For
example, the single employer question can arise in cases alleging breach of a collective bargaining
agreement or the proper makeup of a bargaining unit in an NLRB election, while the "ally defense"
is raised to defeat a claim of secondary boycott, and the alter ego issue often appears in both "veilpiercing"(liability) and successorship cases. See Siebert & Webber, supra note 157, at 874, 877.
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should properly both be considered the employer of a certain employee and should
be bound by each others' agreements.164
N.L.R.B. v. E.C. Atkins & Company,16 1 for example, represents an early

application of what has since become known as the Res-Care or "government joint

employer" doctrine. 66 There, the NLRB was faced with a situation where "the
absolute power to hire and fire [and] the power to control all the activities of' a
group of security guards had been assumed by the military during World War 11.167
Nevertheless, the Board declared that the factory owner retained key indicia of
employer status, such as "the power to determine the wages and hours of another,
coupled with the obligation to bear the financial burden of those wages and the
receipt of the benefits of the hours worked.1 68 The Court approved the Board's
finding that Atkins was in fact still the employer, observing that it had retained
control over "the most important incidents of the employer-employees [sic]
relationship - wages, hours and promotions."' 69
By contrast, as we have seen, the Board has been reluctant to impose
liability on modem owners/operators who consciously shift all these rights and
responsibilities to a subcontractor in order to avoid being held liable to the

164

See, e.g., Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473 (1964); N.L.R.B. v. Browning-Ferris

Indus. of Pennsylvania, Inc., 691 F.2d 1117 (3d Cir. 1982), enforced 259 N.L.R.B. 148 (1981);
Bracteal Hospital Med. Ctr., 313 N.L.R.B. 592 (1993); Cf Island Creek Coal Co., 279 N.L.R.B. 858
(1986).
165

331 U.S. 398 (1947).

In Res-Care,Inc., 280 N.L.R.B. 670, 673 (1986), a case involving a government contractor,
the Board found that the employer was effectively precluded from engaging in meaningful collective
bargaining because the government had occupied the field of setting wages and benefits through its
cost-plus contract with Res-Care. Because the government employer was exempt from the NLRA, the
Board declined to order any bargaining at all. Id. The case was overruled in part by Management
TrainingCorp., 317 N.L.R.B. 1355 (1995), which did permit bargaining by the private employer over
those matters which it controls. Although the Board has never admitted as such, these "government
employer" cases are logically indistinguishable from the so-called "joint employer" cases. Compare
Teledyne Econ. Dev. v. N.L.R.B., 108 F.3d 56 (4th Cir. 1997); and Aramark Corp., 154 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1169 (Feb. 28, 1997) with Greyhound Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. 1488, 1494 (1965) (holding that
cost-plus service contract effectively limited wage increases).
166

167

Atkins, 331 U.S. at 413-14.

168

Id. at 404.

169

Id at 413. For more modem applications of this test, see Teledyne Econ. Dev., 108 F.3d 56;

Aramark Corp., 154 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1169; Management Training Corp., 317 N.L.R.B. 1355 (1995).
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employees.170 However, employer/contractors are not always successful. For
example, in N.L.RB. v. Browning-FerrisIndustries of Pennsylvania,Inc., the

Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the NLRB's finding that a refuse-hauling
company and the broker that furnished its trucks and drivers were joint employers.
The court "recognize[d] that the business entities involved are in fact separate but
[found] that they share or co-determine those matters governing the essential terms
and conditions of employment.' 172 The court explained that Browning-Ferris

"retained for itself sufficient control of the terms and conditions of employment of
the employees who are employed by the other employer" to be held liable, noting
that, among other factors, it set the truckers' starting times, directed their work,
maintained logs, and effectively disciplined the workers. 73 Interestingly, the court
rejected the company's argument that it could only be held liable if it was found to
be a "single employer" with the labor broker. Although it agreed that the two

companies were not fully integrated, it held that they were in fact joint employers,
and upheld the NLRB's order that both employers must bargain with the union. 7 4

See, e.g., Island Creek Coal Co., 279 N.L.R.B. 858 (1986). In Island Creek, the Board
refused to hold that Island Creek was ajoint employer with its contractor, L & M. The Board declared
that
[t]here is absolutely no evidence in the record to indicate that the normal functions
of an employer, the hiring and firing, the processing of grievances, the
negotiations of contracts, the administration of contracts, the granting of vacations
or leave of absences, were in any way ever performed by ICCC. The record
clearly reflects that these normal functions exclusively were performed by L & M.
Id. at 863-64. See also G. Wes Ltd. Co., 309 N.L.R.B. 225, 226 (1992) (merely routine direction..
. [is] insufficient to support a joint employer finding"); accord Chesapeake Foods, Inc., 287 N.L.R.B.
405 (1987).
170

171

691 F.2d 1117 (3d Cir. 1982).

172

Id at 1122-23. The NLRB later reaffirmed this test in TLI, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 798 (1984).

173

Browning-Ferris,691 F.2d at 1123-25.

Id at 1123-24. As the court explained, the Supreme Court set forth the four-factor "single
employer" test in Radio and Television Broad. Technicians Local Union 1264 v. Broad. Serv. of
Mobile, Inc., 380 U.S. 255, 256 (1965) (considering the issue whether the radio station was part of
larger broadcasting service; relevant factors were (1) interrelationship of operations, (2) centralized
control of labor relations, (3) common management and (4) common ownership). See also Parklane
Hosiery Co., Inc., 203 N.L.R.B. 597, 612 (1973). By contrast, the single-factor "joint employer" test
was first enunciated a year earlier in a case involving Greyhound's control over porters, janitors, and
maids who worked for a contractor cleaning its bus station floors. See Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376
U.S. 473 (1964). On remand, the NLRB and the Fifth Circuit both found that Greyhound was indeed
ajoint employer with its subcontractor. See Greyhound Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. 1488 (1965), enforced
N.L.R.B. v. Greyhound Corp., 368 F.2d 778, 780 (5th Cir. 1966).
174

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol100/iss3/5

36

Crandall et al.: Hiding behind the Corporate Veil: Employer Abuse of the Corporate
EMPLOYER ABUSE OF THE CORPORATE FORM

1998]

Similarly, the NLRB has found joint employer liability to exist in contract
coal mining situations, even where the contract purports to relieve the owner of all
such liability, as in the West Virginia cases discussed above. 5 However, the
NLRB has closely scrutinized both the industry and the particular facts involved in
each case. In addition, it has been increasingly reluctant to hold owner/contractors
liable absent a finding that they not only retained but actually exercised control over
the day-to-day functioning of the enterprise.'76 For example, in Metcalf,'" a
representation election case in which the UMWA sought to represent a unit of all
production and maintenance employees working in a mine, the NLRB found that
Sundance, the mine operator/employer was a joint employer with Metcalf, its onsite contractor.' It based this finding on the facts that Sundance's mine manager
had day-to-day responsibility for the overall operations of the mine, that he
determined both where and how contractor Metcalf and his employees were to work
each day, and that both companies employed similar types of employees and
occasionally operated each others' equipment. 9 Furthermore, Sundance retained
general managerial authority over the contractors' employees, even though Metcalf
had his own direct supervisors 80
Similarly, in Jewell Smokeless,' the Union filed a representation petition
naming both Jewell and 22 "subsidiaries" or contract operators mining coal on its
property. Over Jewell's vehement objections and despite the fact that Jewell did not
hire, fire, or direct the contractor's employees, the Board found that Jewell
exercised "critical control" over the supplier's operations, and therefore that it is "at
least the joint employer of these employees."'8 As the Board explained,

175

See supra notes 143-152 and accompanying text.

176

Compare, e.g., Clayton B. Metcalf, 223 N.L.R.B. 642 (1976), Jewell Smokeless Coal Corp.,

170 N.L.R.B. 392 (1968), affd 435 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1970); and Norma Mining Corp., 101
N.L.RtB. 944 (1952), enforced 206 F.2d 38 (4th Cir. 1953) with Island Creek Coal Co., 279 N.L.R.B.
858, 863-64 (1986). This trend is also reflected outside the coal industry. See, e.g., Southern
California Gas Co., 302 N.L.R.B. 456, 461 (1991).
177

223 N.L.R.B. 642 (1976).

178

Id at 643-44.

179

Id.

180

Id.

181

170 N.L.R.B. 392 (1968).

182

Id. at 393.
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Jewell exercises considerable control over the manner and means
by which the operators extract the coal. The ownership of the coal
as well as the mines, remains at all times vested in Jewell. The
operators ...must deliver the coal to Jewell's tipple at a rate
which Jewell sets ....Finally, the entire arrangement ...can be
terminated at any time, without notice or cause .... Under the
circumstances, and consideringthe industrialrealitiesof the coal
mining industry, the conclusion is inescapable that Jewell is a
necessary party to meaningful collective bargaining and is at the
least, 'an employer' of the employees .... "
In a subsequent unfair labor practice case, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the NLRB's
conclusion, holding that Jewell possessed sufficient indicia of control over the work
of the employees of [a contractor] to be treated.., as joint employer with [it.] 8 4
Similar facts led to similar results as far back as 1952, when the Board found Norma
Mining Corporation to be ajoint employer with its lessees for purposes of enforcing
an order to cease and desist from an unfair labor practice, another decision that the
Fourth Circuit upheld. 5 The Board found that Norma's power to shut down the
mines completely on twenty-four hours notice resulted in "the ultimate control over
an employee - the power effectively to terminate his employment - [being] vested
in Norma."'8 6
However, in recent years, the Board has backed away from this "ultimate
control" standard, in the coal industry as well as elsewhere. For example, in 1986,
it refused to hold Island Creek liable as ajoint employer with its contractor, L & M,
reasoning that
[t]here is absolutely no evidence in the record to indicate that the
normal functions of an employer, the hiring and firing, the

183

Id. (emphasis added).

184

N.L.R.B. v. Jewell Smokeless Coal Corp., 435 F.2d 1270, 1271 (4th Cir. 1970). By contrast,

later Boards have found that companies were joint employers for purposes of liability but applied a
higher standards for representation cases. See, e.g., U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co., 247 N.L.R.B. 139
(1980); see also infra notes 187-195 and accompanying text.
185

Norma Mining Corp., 101 N.L.R.B. 944 (1952), enforced 206 F.2d 38 (4th Cir. 1953).

186

Id. at 945. Of course, it should be noted that bringing, litigating, and winning such cases,

while possible, is expensive and involves complex and highly contested discovery issues. Therefore,
as a practical matter, sophisticated user employers have always been able to draft agreements that allow
them ample power over contract workers yet protect them almost totally from NLRA obligations.
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processing of grievances, the negotiations of contracts, the
administration of contracts, the granting of vacations or leave of
absences, were in any way ever performed by [Island Creek]. The
record clearly reflects that these normal functions exclusively were
performed by L & M."s 7
Of c6urse, neither Jewell nor Norma Mining ever performed any of these functions
either. Thus, it appears that the Reagan-era Board was clearly no longer as
concerned about "industrial realities" as the 1968 Board had been.
Indeed, recent Boards have explicitly declared that they will no longer rely
on a landowner's retention of the right to control operations at its facilities, or even
the right to expel a contractor's employees, effectively terminating the employees,
as evidence of joint-employer status.188 Thus, the Board increasingly permits
owners to reserve the right to dictate working conditions, including daily operations
down to the last detail, as well as the ability to set wages through cost-plus
contracts, and the ultimate authority to decide whether a worker can work on any
given day or at all, yet refuses to recognize that they are, in effect acting as an
employer under the NLRA. Thus, the Board's joint employer jurisprudence bears
increasingly little relationship to the realities of the modem coal industry, or to the
so-called "contingent labor force" in general. 89
As a result, instead of a single election followed by joint collective
bargaining negotiations and a single, coordinated contract governing all the workers
in the mine, the NLRB's strict adherence to its outdated rules has the effect of
forcing the union into a never-ending series of disjointed, complex, uncoordinated
elections, negotiations, contract terms, and enforcement problems. At best, this

Island Creek Coal Co., 279 N.L.R.B. 858, 863-64 (1986). See also Martiki Coal Corp, 315
N.L.R.B. 476 (1994); Hobbs & Oberg Mining Co., 297 N.L.R.B. 575 (1990), enforced 940 F.2d 1538
(10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,503 U.S. 959 (1992).
187

188

As it explained in Southern California Gas, "An employer receiving contracted labor

services will of necessity exercise sufficient control over the operations of the contractor at its facility
so that it will be in a position to take action to prevent disruption of its own operations." Southern
California Gas, 302 N.L.R.B. 456, 461 (1991); Trinity Bldg. Maintenance Co., 312 N.L.R.B. 715

(1993).
A recent UMWA organizing case illustrates an additional problem created by this
dissonance. In Mingo Logan Coal Co., Case No. 9-RC-16382 (N.L.R.B. Aug. 13, 1996) (decision on
review and order) (on file with authors), the Union petitioned for an election in a single bargaining unit
made up of miners employed by Mingo Logan itself and those employed by two of its subcontractors,
all of whom worked side by side in the same coal mine. The NLRB refused, holding that under
Greenhoot,Inc., 205 N.L.R.B. 250, 251 (1973), multi-employer elections cannot be held without the
consent of each joint employer.
189
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leads to uncoordinated, duplicative and burdensome bargaining, while at worst, it
fosters head-to-head competition between workers to agree to the lowest wages and
fewest benefits, thus securing the most work for the least money and "winning" the
race to the bottom. It is difficult to see how either scenario promotes the labor
peace and efficiency that the NLRA was intended to foster, 90 except by making it
more and more difficult to organize these workers. Fortunately, the Board is
currently reconsidering the appropriateness of these rules, and may soon adopt
standards which more accurately reflect economic realities. 9'
A final problem (or advantage, depending on the reader's point of view)
arising out of these subcontracting relationships is the insulation they offer the
owner/lessor from labor disputes, such as picketing and strikes. Unlike the more
recent cases interpreting the WPCA, the secondary boycott prohibitions found in
Section 8(b) of the NLRA' 9 contain no exceptions recognizing the modern reality
of the lessor/contractor relationship. Instead, they adhere to the traditional view
that mine owners are assumed to have little or no control over their contractors'
employees, and thus the employees are barred from picketing or striking them over
the contractor's failure to honor obligations to the workers.' 93
Section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA, inter alia,provides that it shall be an unfair
labor practice for a union
(i) to induce an employee to refuse to work or (ii) to threaten,
coerce or restrain any person, if an object of the behavior described
in (i) or (ii) is '(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease doing
business with any other person ... Provided that nothing in this
190
The goal of the NLRA is, among other things, to encourage "the friendly adjustment of
industrial disputes," and to "restor[e] equality of bargaining power between employers and
employees." National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
191

The Board recently announced that it would reconsider its Greenhoot rule, which requires

employer consent for multi-employer bargaining units. See Jeffboat Division, Am. Commercial and
Marine Services Co., and TT&O Enterprises, 9-UC-406 (N.L.R.B. filed Nov. 22, 1995) (Order
Granting Petition for Review N.L.R.B. May 3, 1996), and M.B. Sturgis, Inc., 14-RC-1 1572 (N.L.R.B.
filed Nov. 3, 1995). In Jefjboat, the Teamsters had sought to include employees of a subcontractor,
TT&O, to an existing bargaining unit of employees of the "main" employer. On October 4, 1996, the
Board sought amicus briefs by interested parties on a number of specific legal questions, and it held
oral argument on December 2, 1996. Jeffboat Div., Am. Commercial and Marine Servs. Co,. and
TT&O Enterprises, 9-UC-406, and M.B. STURGIS, Inc., 14-RC-1 1572 (N.L.R.B. filed Nov. 3 1995)
(notice of hearing issued October 4, 1996, order of argument dated December 2, 1996) (on file with

authors).
192

See Labor Management Relations Act, § 303, 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1988).

193

See, e.g., Ramar Coal Co. v. UMWA, 814 F. Supp 502 (W.D. Va. 1993).
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clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where not
otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing.' 94
The Supreme Court has defined "secondary boycott" as "pressure brought to bear
not upon the employer who alone is a party [to a dispute], but upon some third party
who has no concern in it, with the objective of forcing the third party to bring
pressure on the employer to agree to the union's demands."' 95 Furthermore, for
purposes of this section (though not for all purposes), the Board has declared that
separate corporate subsidiaries are separate persons, each entitled to protection from
the labor disputes of the other, "if neither the subsidiary or the parent exercises
actual or active, as opposed to merely potential, control over the day-to-day
operations or labor relations of the other."' 9'6
Although it might seem obvious that a mine owner/lessor might have some
concerns in disputes between their subcontractors and employees working in their
mines, neither the NLRB nor the courts have been willing to make that leap.
Instead, courts have often held that mine owner/operators are "neutral" or
"secondary" employers, even where they are completely dependent on and in some
cases intimately connected to the primary targets.'97 It is theoretically possible to
defend charges of secondary activity where the union can prove that the secondary
employer is so closely linked to the primary that it loses its neutral status, a theory
known as the "ally doctrine," but such cases are notoriously difficult to prove and
win in the coal fields. The standard is whether the secondary employer is firmly
allied in economic interest with the primary employer, and is often limited to
situations where the secondary employer is so closely related and/or integrated with

194

National Labor Relations Act, § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1988), as summarized by

then-Judge, now Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg in Production Workers Union of Chicago v. N.L.R.B.,

793 F.2d 323, 330 (D.C. Cir 1986).
N.L.R.B. v. Operating Engn'rs, 400 U.S. 297, 303 (1971) (involving a strike against
subcontractors in order to pressure a general contractor to execute a union contract); see also National
Woodwork Mfg. Ass'n v. N.L.RB., 386 U.S. 612, 627 (1967); Teamsters Local 560 (Curtin Matheson
Scientific, Inc.), 248 N.L.R.B. 1212, 1213 (1980).
195

Los Angeles Newspaper Guild, Local 69 (Hearst Corp.), 185 N.L.R.B. 303, 304 (1970)
(picketing of separate division of parent corporation was secondary); cf Teamsters Local 560 (Curtin
Matheson Scientific,Inc.), 248 N.L.R.B. at 1214-15 (finding that the picketing of a corporate branch
was lawful where parent retained final authority over collective bargaining).
196

197

See, e.g., Kinty v. UMWA, 544 F.2d 706, 712 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1093

(1977).
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the primary employer that they either constitute a single enterprise or act as coemployers (joint employers) of the same employees 98
The Union bears the burden of proving that the plaintiff employer is an ally
rather than a neutral, which requires, among other factors, that it prove that the
contractor and the owner share a common system of managerial control, particularly
99
over labor relations, and that the ally controls the work force of the primary.
Other factors include common ownership, integration of operations, economic
dependence (relevant but not dispositive), exclusive or substantial dealing (relevant
but not dispositive), common premises, common employees, commingling of funds,
and separate procedural identity, each of which are weighed in what the Fourth
Circuit calls a "naked exercise ofjudicial discretion."" °
In Kinty v. UMWA, 0 the union argued unsuccessfully that the fact that a
subcontractor works solely for the mine operator (hauling coal from a mine) and
that the mine is the trucker's only customer, should establish that the trucker is an
ally of the operator. Instead, the court held that economic dependence of the
secondary on the primary, or exclusive or substantial dealings between the primary
and the secondary are not in themselves a conclusive determination of ally status."
Thus, in many contract mine operator cases where the owner/operator
retains but does not exercise actual control over workers or control their day to day
activities, the union will often be unable to meet the Board's constricted test for
"ally" status and the "secondary" or mine owner will probably be immune from
collective action under Section 8(b)(4)(B). This is despite the fact that, as we have
seen, mine owners like Island Creek can effectively "fire" their contractor's
employees by the simple expedient of locking out the contractor, while at the same
time the NLRB considers them "neutral" and not only shields them from any

198

Kinty, 544 F.2d at 715, or where the secondary target is performing "struck work," i.e., is

providing goods or services to replace the products which are normally supplied by the primary
employer whose workers are on strike. Id.
199

Id. at 718 (citing Vulcan Materials Co. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 430 F.2d 446, 451

(5th Cir. 1970). This, of course, is similar to the "joint employer" and single employer tests discussed
above, and is precisely what a contract operator is usually careful not to do.
200

Id. at 716. Evidence of common management, common labor policies, actual control over

workers, overlapping management functions, economic, and/or operational integration, such as where
the secondary employer controls day to day activities of employees, are also helpful in demonstrating

ally status.
201

544 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1976).

202

Id. at 716.
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liability, but allows them to sue the union for damages if it directs any action
against them." 3
Such a result does not comport with reality, where it was the owner who
arguably caused the labor dispute, as in Shield, by withholding the contractor's last
paycheck and kicking it and its employees off the property, or where a contractor
has clearly taken sides. The NLRA's failure to recognize this reality virtually
eliminates workers' ability to meaningfully exercise their NLRA Section Seven
rights to use concerted activity to resolve these triangular employment disputes.
It seems clear that these prohibitions are outdated, and that certain revisions
are in order. First, as a matter of policy, the NLRB and federal courts should follow
the lead of West Virginia and similar courts and declare that third party employers
and prime contractors are in fact employers, and can be picketed, sued, enjoined,
and in every respect treated as such, both by the NLRB construing NLRA Sections
8(a), 8(b), and 8(e) and by federal courts construing Sections 301 and 303 of the
NLRA. Such an approach would not require statutory amendment, since only the
term "employer" appears in the statute itself, as opposed to the terms primary and
secondary. Instead, the NLRB could simply recognize that prime contractors,
owner/lessors, and user employers are just that - employers - under the NLRA, and
treat them as such, abandoning the contortions it currently undergoes to determine
whether an employer is a single employer, joint employer, alter ego, ally, or some
other creature. As the Supreme Court explained in NL.R.B. v. E.C.Atkins & Co.,2'
Congress has granted wide discretion to the NLRB in this area, and instructed it to
"draw substance from the policy and purposes of the Act,the circumstances and
background of particular employment relationships, and all the hard facts of
industrial life, ... [as well as] an appreciation of economic realities, [and] the more
relevant economic and statutory considerations.""0 5
Second, if needed, the 1947 secondary boycott prohibitions should be
amended, as has the West Virginia Wage Act, to reflect the reality that
owner/lessors such as Pittston, Island Creek, and Massey truly act as the employers
of the workers who produce their coal, that they benefit from their work, and as

203

See, e.g., supra note 104 and accompanying text, where Island Creek was legally permitted

to throw Shield off its property and lock out its workers, but the workers were not permitted to picket
or protest against Island Creek without facing charges of secondary activity. One might question just
where Shield's workers were permitted to picket, since Shield had no mine, no assets, no office
location, nor any rights to the mine property itself. Indeed, the only logical alternative to picketing in
front of Island Creek's property might be to picket the bankruptcy court, the "situs" of the disputed
wages owed to the workers. Cf Moore Dry Dock Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 547 (1950).
204

331 U.S. 398 (1947).

205

Id. at 403.
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such they should be held liable for those worker' wages and benefits. The authors
recognize that such a recognition may require amending portions of the National
Labor Relations Act and/or the Taft-Hartley Act in order to clarify that
owner/contractors are to be considered third-party employers of contract employees
who work on their property, or at a minimum that such persons are not neutrals, but
submit that such an amendment is long overdue?' Such revisions might help return
the focus of the NLRB and the courts to where they should be: protecting innocent
employees against unscrupulous operators, rather than protecting contract
employers from the legitimate claims of those same workers. In addition, such
reforms would help remove the perverse incentives present in the current system,
and allow employees to file a single lawsuits in a single forum, ideally the NLRB,
to collect their collectively-bargained wages and benefits from the party who can
best afford to pay them - the mine owner.

VI.

RETIREE HEALTH CARE OBLIGATIONS

Securing healfh care coverage for miners and their families has been a
major issue in the Appalachian coal fields for many, many years, and a major goal
of the UMWA for at least the last fifty years. The UMWA has fought for health
care on the picket line, at the bargaining table, as an organizing issue and in
Congress. In each of these arenas, the Union has fought time and again to obtain,
protect, and ensure that its working and retired members and their families enjoy
lifetime health care benefits. As UMWA President Cecil E. Roberts has declared,
"coal miners and their families earned the right to decent health care with our sweat
and blood. In 1946 and again in 1992 the government made a sacred promise of
health care security to retired coal miners. That promise will hold because of our
solidarity."2 7
The issue of health care for miners first rose to national prominence in
1946, when the Union, under the leadership of John L. Lewis, first proposed an
independent health care system in national negotiations with the BCOA.2 8 The

206

For more specific suggestions, see Becker, supra note 157, at 1550-61; Englestein, supra

note 157, at 333-42; Befort, supra note 157, at 101-05.
UMWA, KEEP THE PROMISE: COAL INDUSTRY RETIREE HEALTH BENEFIT ACT, (Jan. 1998)
(quoting United Mine Workers Association President Cecil Roberts); see also A PromiseKept: The
UMWA Health and Retirement Funds Turn 50, 107 UMWA JOURNAL 11-13 (May-June 1996).
207

208

MAIER

B. Fox, UNITED

WE STAND: THE UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA

1890-1990

403-08 (1990); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae United Mine Workers of America in Support of
Respondents at 2-8, Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, No. 97-42, (U.S. 1997) [hereinafter Amicus Brie] (oral
argument scheduled for March 4, 1998).
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Union's goal was to replace the old "company doctor" model, paid by deductions
from miners' wages but employed and controlled by the company, with an
independent health insurance system, paid for by all the companies jointly, in an
effort to improve both the 4uality and the amount of medical care available to its
members2 9
After the BCOA turned Lewis down, the UMWA called a national strike
in support of its health care proposal, and 400,000 coal miners walked off the job.210
Finally, President Truman stepped in and seized the mines, exercising his powers
under the War Labor Disputes Act. At the same time, he ordered Secretary of the
Interior Julius Krug to negotiate with the Union on behalf of the United States (and
the industry), culminating in the signing of the historic Krug-Lewis Agreement at
the White House." That agreement created what are now known as the UMWA
Health and Retirement Funds ("UMWA Funds").2" 2 In turn, the Funds created the
first comprehensive, employer-funded medical care and pension system in any
industry in the United States and one which other Unions sought to emulate.2 13
Over the next few years, the UMWA Funds helped to create and finance an
independent health care network serving coal miners and their families throughout
the coal fields, including specialized black lung and rehabilitation clinics, ten
hospitals, and numerous pharmacies and doctors' offices.2 1 4 More recently, the
UMWA Funds' role has evolved gradually from a direct health care provider into
an insurer and collection agent. However, their mission remains the same:
providing lifetime health care coverage for retired coal miners and their dependants
using collectively-bargained contributions made by signatory employers.
The more difficult part of that mission has proved to be securing a stable
and consistent funding stream to finance these benefits. If anything, funding has

209

Fox, supranote 208, at 410-11.

210

Id.; see also UMWA, KEEP THE PROMISE (Jan. 20, 1998) (on file with authors).

211

Fox, supra note 208, at 403-08.

212

Amicus Brief at 4, Eastern Enters., No. 97-42. The two original funds were the UMWA

Welfare and Retirement Fund and the UMWA Medical and Hospital Fund. Since 1946, they have
been reorganized several times, most notably in 1950, again in 1974, and in 1993 with the passage of
the Coal Act. They now consist of five different trust funds or "Plans:" the 1950 Pension Trust and
the 1974 Pension Trust, which offer pension benefits, and the Combined Benefit Fund, the 1992
Benefit Plan, and the 1993 Benefit Fund, each of which offers health insurance coverage to certain
retirees and their dependents. Id. at 7.
213

Fox, supra note 208, at 416.

214

Fox, supra note 208, at 415-17; CoAL CoMM. RPT., supra note 83, at 15-29.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1998

45

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 100, Iss. 3 [1998], Art. 5
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100:537

become increasingly less stable in the last two decades, as health care costs have
spiraled upward, while at the same time employment in the mines has fallen sharply.
This imbalance has created a financial crisis for the UMWA Funds which has been
well-documented elsewhere.2 5 The UMWA Funds, the Union, and BCOA
responded to this financial pressure in a variety of ways. At one point, in the
summer of 1977, the UMWA Funds temporarily cut off medical benefits, which led
to a massive unauthorized work stoppage. 16 In response, the parties agreed in the
1978 NBCWA to partially decentralize the provision of health care, by requiring
each individual employer to sponsor its own "individual employer plan" to cover
both its current workforce and its retirees.217
By the mid-1980s, as health care costs continued to escalate, some
companies began searching for ways to escape their obligations to their retirees, and
refused to pay and/or to sign successor agreements. The issue came to a head in
1989, when Pittston Coal Company refused to continue health care payment for its
retirees and withdrew from the multi-employer funds. The 321-day strike which
ensued has been described as "one of the most bitter strikes in recent labor
history."2 ' The Pittston strike drew community, national, and international
attention, and led to the arrests of thousands of UMWA supporters, including labor,
religious, and civil rights leaders. Finally, Secretary of Labor Elizabeth Dole
stepped in and appointed a "super mediator" to assist in resolving the strike, and the
parties were ultimately able to reach a new agreement and return to work.' 9
By this time, both the Union and Secretary Dole realized that the issue of
health care security for retirees and their families had grown too large to be resolved
through collective bargaining alone, and was, in her words, "an issue larger than the
Pittston dispute." As a result, Secretary Dole appointed a blue ribbon commission
to recommend a long-term solution to the health care funding crisis, and to suggest
a long-term, nationwide solution to the problem. The group, which became known

See e.g., COAL COMM. RPT., supra note 83, at vii, 3, 44-47. As the Commission has
documented, in 1990 the Funds faced a $115 million deficit, threatening the health care of more than
120,000 retired miners and their families. Id. The average beneficiary was then 76 years old and more
than half were elderly widows. Id.
215

216

COAL COMM. RPT., supra note 83, at 25.

217

NBCWA of 1978, Article XX.

218

HearingBefore the Subcommittee on Medicare andLong-term Care ofthe Senate Committee

on Finance, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. at 303 (Sept. 25, 1991) [hereinafter 1991 Subcommittee Hearings].
219

That mediator was William Usery, ex-Secretary of Labor, who would later chair the Coal

Commission. Id.
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as the Coal Commission, conducted an exhaustive study of the issues that
confronted the UMWA retiree health care system and issued a report on November
5, 1990.'o That report laid the groundwork for what eventually became the Coal
22 1

Act.

The Commission found that "the combination of skyrocketing health care
costs, an increasing number of retirees who have been abandoned by their
employers, and a small percentage of coal producers making contributions to the
UMWA Funds have put the health care program for retirees in a financial crisis."' m
The Commission also recognized that "[t]he escalating cost of providing adequate
health care to coal miners and their families, particularly the increasing population
of orphan retirees, cannot properly or fairly be solved by the parties through
It recommended that the collective bargaining
collective bargaining alone."
obligations of both current and past signatories be replaced by a statutory obligation
to fund the long-promised health care delivery system. It also suggested a statutory
mechanism to prevent future "dumping" of retirees and their concomitant health
care costs onto the Funds or other coal operators, as well as additional funding

sources and cost controls.

4

Congress then took up the matter, led by Senator Rockefeller, one of the
earliest and strongest proponents of what eventually became the Coal Act. As he

explained,

220

COAL CoMM. RPT., supranote 83.

221

Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992,26 U.S.C. §§ 9701-22 (1994) [hereinafter

the Coal Act). The Coal Act guaranteed the health benefits (and in some cases the death benefits) of
retirees who were age and service eligible as of February 1, 1993, and who actually retired by
September 30, 1994. See id. § 9711. Enacted with the support of both the United Mine Workers of
America and the Bituminous Coal Operators' Association, the Coal Act requires responsible employers
to provide and pay for these benefits for life. Benefits under the act are provided either directly by the
retiree's last employer, or by one of two newly-created Funds, the United Mine Workers of America
Combined Benefit Fund or the United Mine Workers of America 1992 Benefit Plan. Amicus Briefat
20-24, Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, No. 97-42, (U.S. 1997).
222

COAL CoMM. RPT., supra note

223

Id. at 3, 60, 74.

83, at vii.

Ia At 61-67. The Commission actually proposed two alternative methods of funding retiree
health insurance costs: (1) creation of a quasi-governmental corporation financed by an industry-wide
tax on all coal operators, or (2) the creation of a new private multi-employer fund financed by current
and former NBCWA signatories to provide health care to UMWA retirees. A more complex version
of the second proposal was ultimately adopted. See Amicus Brief at 12, EasternEnters., No. 97-42.
224
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this problem affects the entire industry and in fact the entire
country.... We are talking about tens of thousands of elderly and
often infirm people who long ago earned these benefits by firing
the furnaces of American industry in war and in peace. The
industry and national commitments to health care for these miners
and their families must and will be kept.'
Several individuals testified at the Subcommittee hearing, including retired miners
and their wives. Dixie Woolum, the widow of a Massey Coal Company miner,
testified,
My husband, Jimmy, worked in the mines for the same coal
company for 45 years. He died when he was sixty years old, three
He gave his life in the
months after his last working day ....
mines. I packed his dinner bucket and got him off to work every
day for 45 years. Then to show how much they cared, Massey
Coal Company took my insurance card away in 1984. Finally after
years without health benefits, the funds picked up my coverage..
. I was born in a coal-company house. We raised our family in
a company house, and I remember when we got the UMWA funds.
... After we got the funds Jimmy always said to me, "Dixie, if
anything should happen to me, you and the kids will be taken care
of." This is what they promised him and that is what we planned
on and what we believed. 6
Retired miner UMWA retiree Homer Eckley agreed:
I grew up in a coal mining family, four generations of them. That
was back when there was no benefits, nothing.... I went into the
mine with the idea that when my time came, I could retire and have
benefits, plus a pension.... Now they tell me that my mine was
sold to another company and they are complaining about paying
these benefits. I disagree. The entire coal industry is part of the

1991 Subcommittee Hearings,supranote 218, at 2-3 (opening statement of Subcommittee
Chairman Rockefeller).

2z5

226

Id. at 4.
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problem and the entire coal industry should be part of the
solution. 7
The hearings eventually led to Congressional passage ofthe 1992 Coal Act,
which was intended to ensure lifetime health care benefits for people like Dixie
Woolum and Homer Eckley. 2 8 The Coal Act represented a comprehensive effort
to craft a permanent solution to these seemingly intractable problems. It
reorganized the UMWA Funds, and carefully delineated the identities of all eligible
recipients22 9 and the companies which would be responsible for paying their
benefits. Finally, it set up a funding stream that was designed to ensure that health
benefits would be guaranteed for the life of the beneficiaries, that the responsible
employers would pay for those benefits, and that a fall-back plan would be in place
if an employer stopped making payments, regardless of the reason. The Coal Act
also adopted a permanent allocation and financing structure based on the principle
that each signatory company would "pay for its own" retirees' health care, through
one of three overlapping benefit plans. First, under Section 9711 of the Coal Act,
each company was required to continue its single employer plan covering its own
retirees, as had been required under each successor NBCWA since 1978. Second,
the act created a new plan known as the 1992 Benefit Plan to provide benefits to
retirees whose former employers fail to provide such coverage under their own
plans, sometimes described as "orphaned retirees." ' Finally, the existing 1950 and
1974 Benefit Funds and their beneficiaries were consolidated and rolled into a new
"Combined Benefit Fund, with a guaranteed funding stream.""
Id. at 5. See also id.at 10 (statements of BCOA Chairman Michael Reily) (asserting that
NBCWA signatory companies "have a moral obligation to the funds"); id. at 48 (statements of
Professor Henry H. Perrit, Jr.) (companies and government must "honor [their] commitments to retirees
who worked hard to create economic prosperity for others").
227

228

An earlier version of the bill had passed both Houses of Congress in March 1992, but was

vetoed by then-President Bush. The final version was enacted in July as part of H.R. 776, The Energy
Act, and was signed by President Bush on October 24, 1992. See 138 CONG. Rnc. S10558, S10627
(daily ed. July 29, 1992)
229

Eligible recipients were defined as those who were both age- and service-eligible to retire

by February 1, 1993, and who actually did retire before October 1, 1994 and their dependents. See 26

U.S.C. § 971 1(b)(1)-(2) (1994).
230

See 26 U.S.C. § 9712(b)(2) (1994).

See 26 U.S.C. § 9702(a)(2) (1994). The Combined Benefit Fund covers only pensioners who
had retired prior to July 20, 1992, and their dependants, and is closed to new beneficiaries. It is funded
through premiums paid by each "assigned operator," covering beneficiaries who either worked for that
company or who have been "assigned" by the Secretary of Health and Human Services to that
231
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Perhaps the most important feature of the new act is its detailed funding
mechanism. In brief, it created a "reach-back" system whereby signatory employers
or their successors pay a monthly per beneficiary premium, based on the number of
plan beneficiaries attributable to that employer or its predecessors. Certain

operators are also assessed annual pre-funding premiums to fund benefits for those
"orphan retirees" whose last signatory employer(s) are out of business.3 2 The goal

was to allocate costs as fairly as possible by reaching back to include employers
which had been signatory at any time since 1946 and have them pick up the current
costs for their retirees, regardless of whether they remain signatory or even whether
they remain in the coal business. As Senator Rockefeller explained, "Instead of
including a broad industry wide tax, the basic funding mechanism of this legislation
generally requires premium payments from those for whom the retirees worked.
These are the responsible companies. ' 2
With the passage of the Coal Act in 1992, the funds were restructured and
revitalized, thousands of beneficiaries had their benefits restored, and it appeared
that the promise of lifetime health care coverage was secure at last. To date, at least

six circuit courts of appeals have affirmed its constitutionality and upheld its
funding mechanism.3 4
However, the Supreme Court recently disagreed, holding in a split decision
that the Coal Act was unconstitutional as applied to Eastern Enterprises, a so-called
"super reach-back" company? 5 The case arose out of an inter-company dispute
between Eastern and its former subsidiary Eastern Associated Coal Corporation

employer, as well as from surpluses in other funds, such as the 1950 Pension Plan and the Abandoned
Mine Lands Reclamation Fund. See 26. U.S.C. §§ 9701(c)(5), 9705 & 9706 (1994).
232

26 U.S.C. § 9712(b)(2) (1994).

233

138 CONo. REc. S 17633 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1992).

These include the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, all of which have
rejected constitutional challenges to the act. See Eastern Enters. v. Chater, 110 F.3d 150 (1st Cir.
1997), rev'd sub nom.Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 118 S.Ct. 2131 (1998); In re Chateaugay Corp., 53
F.3d 478 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 298 (1995); Lindsey Coal Mining Co. v. Chater, 90
F.3d 688 (3d Cir. 1996); Holland v. Keenan Trucking Co., 102 F.3d 736 (4th Cir. 1996); Carbon Fuel
Co. v. USX Corp., 100 F.3d 1124 (4th Cir. 1996); Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Secretary of Health and
Human Services, 79 F.3d 516 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 682 (1997); Barrick Gold
Exploration, Inc. v. Hudson, 47 F.3d 832 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 64 (1995); Davon,
Inc. v. Shalala, 75 F.3d 1114 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 50 (1996).
234

235

Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 118 S.Ct. 2131 (1998). The term "super reach-back company"

means that the coal operator had either stopped mining coal or had not been signatory to a UMWA
contract since at least 974, thus the Act "reaches back" to assess liability. Eastern was signatory to
NBCWA's from 1947 through 1964. Id. at 2143.
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The
("EACC"), which Eastern had sold to Peabody Coal Company in 1987.
Social Security Administration assessed premiums to Eastern for certain
beneficiaries who (or whose spouses) worked for Eastern Enterprises before the
sale, from 1946 to 1965, and who today continue to receive health care benefits originally from the 1950 Benefit Fund and now from the Combined Benefit Fund.
Eastern argued that these Coal Act assignments violated substantive due
process and resulted in an illegal taking of its property without just compensation.
It claimed that it got out of the coal business in 1965, when it created EACC as a
wholly-owned subsidiary, and thus could not now be held liable for any related
costs; instead, it argued that EACC or Peabody (or current signatories, or no one at
all) should pay for the benefits. 8 It also claimed that the imposition of retroactive
Coal Act liability was "arbitrary and irrational" and interfered with its reasonable
Finally, it argued that it transferred any
investment-backed expectations.
remaining retiree health care obligations, including any prospective Coal Act
liabilities, to Peabody when it sold EACC in 1987, and thus could not now be held
liable for these retirees. 240
The Social Security Commissioner and UMWA Combined Benefit Fund
responded that Eastern had helped shape the retirees' expectations of lifetime
benefits, that it had awarded benefit credit for the work at issue, and that it had
profited from the work they performed and the coal they produced. As such, they
defended Congress's allocation of benefit costs as rational, based on a fair and
reasonable assessment of the underlying facts, and maintained that the assignment
provisions of the act did not work an unconstitutional taking.24'
In a splintered opinion, the Court held that the Coal Act was
unconstitutional as applied to Eastern, although it could not agree on the reason
why. Four members found that the act impermissibly violated the takings clause,
while Justice Kennedy disagreed with the plurality's conclusion that the act worked
236

Brief of Respondent Social Security Commissioner at 16-17, Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel,

No. 97-42 (U.S. 1997).
237

Brief of Respondents The UMWA Combined Benefit Fund and its Trustees at 4-5, Eastern

Enters., No. 97-42.
238
LABOR

Opening Brief of Eastern Enterprises at 6, 19-21, EasternEnters., No. 97-42; see also DAiLY
RPT. at A1-2, March 5, 1998 (summarizing oral arguments).

239

Opening Brief of Eastern Enterprises at 20, EasternEnters., No. 97-42.

240

Id. at 21.

241

Brief of the Commissioner of Social Security at 20-47, EasternEnters., No. 97-42; Brief

of UMWA Fund, supra note 237.
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a "taking," but held that applying the law to Eastern violated substantive due
process, because of the law's retroactive effect.242 Four Justices dissented, in two
separate opinions, finding instead, as had the Court of Appeals, that "it was not
fundamentally unfair for Congress to impose upon Eastern liability for the future
health care costs of miners whom it long ago employed . . .," and that "Eastern
played a significant role in creating the miners' expectations [of continuing health
care benefits] that led to this legislation."243 Although the long-term impact of the
Court's decision is unclear, it could potentially upset the Coal Act's carefully
balanced contribution scheme, and may eventually lead to further Congressional
action or other changes.
Even if the Coal Act's financing scheme ultimately survives, however, it
does not cover all the UMWA retirees who are arguably entitled to lifetime benefits.
As noted above, the Act was carefully crafted to cover only retirees who were
eligible to retire before February 1, 1993 and actually did retire by October 1,
1994.244 Thus, health care benefits for future retirees were left up to future
collective bargaining negotiations.
In the 1993 NBCWA, after another long and bitter strike, the Union and the
BCOA negotiated new language in Article XX, which once again attempted to
ensure that each employer provide lifetime health care for its own retirees. In
addition, it added yet another entirely new "orphan" plan, the 1993 Benefit Plan,
which was designed as a fallback to cover retirees whose last signatory employers
go out of business and are financially unable to maintain their health insurance.
contract and the trust document than
However, no sooner was the ink dry on the
245
battles over these obligations began anew.
Ironically, the latest company to try to escape its health care obligations is
Westmoreland Coal Company, which had been one of the loudest voices in the
chorus assuring Congress that it would "pay for our own." Westmoreland Coal
Company operated coal mines in West Virginia and southern Virginia for over
thirty years. As recently as October 1995, its President Christopher Seglem wrote
to Senator Dole declaring that

242

Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. at 2137; id. at 2154 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the

judgment and dissenting in part).
243

Id. at 2167, 2168 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

244

See supra notes 221 & 229.

245

See McClung v. Westmoreland Coal Co., Civ. Act. No. 5:96-2068, (S.D. W. Va. filed Dec.

5, 1996).
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Westmoreland has met its retiree obligations and unlike [certain
other] companies... is committed to seeing the over $700 million
in benefits promised its employees delivered. This means paying
over $20 million per year in cash benefits on behalf of these retired
and elderly former employees and their dependents for many years
to come.246
Furthermore, Seglem argued, any Congressional action to amend the Coal Act that
might require Westmoreland to pay for other companies' retirees would result in a
severe set-back for Westmoreland. However, it was not long before Westmoreland
itself sought to walk away from its $700 million in future health care obligations to
its own retirees and stick someone else with the bill.
In 1993, Westmoreland withdrew from the BCOA and instead signed the
Independent Bituminous Coal Bargaining Alliance ("IBCBA")-UMWA Agreement,
which in turn bound it to certain provisions of the 1993 NBCWA, including
standard language committing the employer to maintain its individual employer
health plan and to provide health insurance to its active employees and certain laidoff employees.2 47 It also agreed to provide health benefits for life to its own
retirees, both those who were covered under the Coal Act and those who retired
under the 1993 Agreement. Finally, it agreed to make all contributions due to each
plan, including the new 1993 Benefit Plan created by the BCOA and UMWA to
cover "future orphans."24
Despite these agreements and its active support for the Coal Act,
Westmoreland soon decided that its contractual and statutory obligations were too
expensive. In 1995, it decided to close its eastern operations and reposition itself
as a cogeneration and terminal operation. It idled its Virginia division mines and
offices and laid off over 500 miners. At the same time, it began a systematic
campaign to divest itself of all remaining UMWA obligations, in particular its
obligations to pay for lifetime health care coverage for its active UMWA
employees, retirees, and dependants (including Coal Act retirees), and its ongoing
duties to contribute to the Funds. It began negotiating with the UMWA Funds its
arrearage and its failing to pay other obligations as they came due. In November
1996, these negotiations apparently failed, and it stopped making payments to its
246

See Letter from Christopher K. Seglem to Senator Robert J. Dole (Oct. 17, 1995) (on file

with authors).
247

These include extended health care benefits for one year for certain laid-off, injured, or

disabled employees. See Independent Bituminous Coal Bargaining Alliance-United Mine Workers
Agreement of 1993, Article XX [hereinafter 1993 IBCBA Agreement].
248
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health insurance company, which abruptly canceled the health cards of thousands
of Westmoreland retirees and widows. The saga that ensued involved at least three
separate lawsuits in three states, and remains the subject of a Chapter Eleven
bankruptcy proceeding in the District of Colorado.249
This chapter of the story opens on the day before Thanksgiving, November
26, 1996, when Westmoreland's insurer abruptly canceled medical insurance
coverage for UMWA retiree Varlin McClung and his wife Zela, 2 ' along with 2,500
other retired or disabled miners, widows, and dependants. McClung was
particularly worried because he was in the middle of a medical crisis. He had
recently suffered a serious infection in his shoulder, and several years earlier,
because arthritis had set in, the bone was removed and a metal artificial joint was
implanted. He had just been released from the hospital, after an operation to
remove the artificial shoulder and lance the infection. He was then sent home with
his bandaged, boneless shoulder strapped to a pillow, and ordered to maintain a
twenty-four-hour intravenous antibiotic pump, at a cost of over $1000 per week.
He was due to return to the hospital for a new implant in six weeks, after the
antibiotic pump did its job and cleared up the infection. Despite his dire situation,
neither the company nor its insurance provider gave any advance notice to the
McClungs that their medical insurance was being canceled. McClung first found
out when the drugstore refused to renew his prescription for antibiotics, and
demanded that he agree to be personally liable for the enormous costs.?" After
contacting his insurer, the company, and the Union, McClung discovered that his
insurance had been canceled as part of the larger ongoing dispute between
Because
Westmoreland, the UMWA Funds, and its insurance carrier.
Westmoreland had stopped making payments to its health benefits administrator,
the insurance carrier in turn began denying claims by McClung's health care
providers, including his pharmacy and his doctor.

249

See In Re Westmoreland Coal Company, No. 96-26092 MSK, Ch. 11, (Bankr. D. Colo. filed

Dec. 23, 1996). Related proceedings include, inter alia,Buckner v. Westmoreland, A.P. No. 97-1058
MSK, (Bankr. D. Colo. Sept. 5, 1997), appealfiledsub nom UMWA 1992 Plan v. Westmoreland Coal
Company, No. 97-AP-2002 (D. Colo. filed Sept. 15, 1997).
250

Mr. McClung worked for Westmoreland for 23

/2

years, and had retired on March 1, 1993,

at the age of 55. Had he been born a month earlier, he would have been eligible for coverage under
the Coal Act.
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order at 3, McClung, Civ. Act. No. 5:96-2068. It did send a letter to him on December 14, 1996, after
agreeing to settle the case and reinstate his benefits.
251
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The day after the termination, Westmoreland mailed a letter to the Union,
the UMWA Funds, and its 2,5002 beneficiaries whose benefits are guaranteed
under the Coal Act, blaming the UMWA Funds for its failure to pay its
administrator and asserted that it was "extremely concerned for you and the
consequences of losing your health care benefits."2 a' In response, the UMWA
Funds accused Westmoreland of misrepresenting the situation, and of cutting off
beneficiaries' insurance in order to put pressure on the UMWA Funds. It argued
that Westmoreland had millions of dollars in cash as well as plenty of other
valuable assets with which to pay its ongoing health care obligations."
Both the 1992 Plan and the Union immediately filed complaints for
temporary restraining orders and injunctive relief ordering Westmoreland to
reinstate"its individual employer health plan." In Buckner v. WestmorelandCoal
Co.,"3 6 the UMWA Funds sought an injunction ordering reinstatement of

Westmoreland's employer health plan for its Coal Act retirees who would otherwise
be entitled to substitute coverage as "orphans" under the 1992 Benefit Plan. The
Union's action, filed on behalf of Mr. McClung and others similarly situated, asked
for reinstatement of an additional 150 retirees who were not covered under the Coal
Act guarantee 7 and whose lifetime health care benefits were required by the 1993
collective bargaining agreement between Westmoreland and the Union. 25 '

252

At the time Westmoreland had approximately 2500 retirees and dependents whose benefits

were guaranteed by the Coal Act. It also had about 150 non-Coal Act retirees, such as McClung.
Transcript of Hearing at 10, Buckner v. Westmoreland, No. 96-187-A (W.D. Va. Dec. 4, 1996).
Letter from Westmoreland Coal Company to "1992 Medical Beneficiary" (Nov. 27, 1996)
(on file with authors); see also 22 COAL WEEK 1-2 (Dec. 9, 1996), CoAL OUTLOOK at 5-6 (Dec. 9,
1996).

253

Letter from David W. Allen, Funds General Counsel, to Christopher K. Seglem, President
of Westmoreland Coal Company (Nov. 29, 1996) (citing Westmoreland's 10-Q report); see also
Transcript of Hearing at 29-33, 34, 113, Buckner, No. 96-187-A.
254

See Buckner, No. 96-0187-A (filed November 27, 1996 on behalf of the 1992 Plan for Coal
Act retirees); McClung, No. 5:96-2068 (filed December 5, 1996 by the Union, McClung, and other
non-Coal Act or "contract" retirees).
255

256

No. 96-187-A (W.D. Va. filed Nov. 27, 1996).

As previously explained, the Coal Act guarantee is limited to retirees who were age-and
service eligible as of February 1, 1993, and who actually retired prior to October 1, 1994. See 29
U.S.C. § 9711 (1994). The benefits of McClung and others who retired later are guaranteed only by
the 1993 IBCBA or NBCWA, depending on their employer, and by general federal labor law.
257

258

McClung, No. 5:96-2068.
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In Buck-er, the judge found that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated
irreparable harm because the 1992 Plan was already accepting and processing
retirees' applications for substitute coverage, as it was required to do under the Coal

Act.

9

As a result, Judge Jones refused to order Westmoreland to reinstate its

employer plan. However, he did order that Westmoreland make weekly payments
to the 1992 Plan during the pendency of the case, to preserve the plan's ability to
collect on any final judgment that might eventually be ordered?6 This result
effectively means that Westmoreland has successfully "dumped" its Coal Act

retirees onto the 1992 Plan.
By contrast, the Union and the individual plaintiffs in the parallel McClung

case fared somewhat better. On December 10, 1996, before the opening of the
scheduled hearing, Westmoreland settled the case by agreeing to reinstate insurance
coverage for the approximately 150 active and retired employees entitled to
coverage under its employer plan?6 With this understanding, Judge Haden

dismissed the case. 262 To date, Westmoreland has complied with the settlement
agreement by hiring a new health care administrator and reinstating its plan? 63
As a result of these events, Westmoreland made one payment to the 1992
Plan in compliance with the judge's order, then filed a petition for Chapter Eleven
bankruptcy reorganization on December 23, 1996, along with its four subsidiary
Section 9712 of the Coal Act requires the 1992 Plan to act as a "fall-back" for eligible
beneficiaries whose last employers stop providing benefits under their own plans. See 26 U.S.C. §
9712(b)(1) (1994).
259

Opinion and Order, Buckner, No. 96-187-A (dated Dec. 5, 1996) (ordering interim payments
of $200,000 per week); Transcript of Trial at 146, Buckner, No. 96-187-A. Westmoreland's President
had testified that its costs for health insurance premiums were running between $200,000 and $400,000
260

per week. Id. at 75.

During the Buckner hearing, Westmoreland had admitted that it was in violation of its
obligations under its collective bargaining agreement with the Union. In its settlement, it also agreed
to pay $10,000 into a special account for medical expenses incurred by the McClungs and others
261

during the two weeks they were denied coverage. Coal Company Agrees to Restore Retiree Benefits,
CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Dec. 11, 1996, at 9A.
262

Order, McClung, No. 5:96-2068 (dated Dec. 20, 1996).

However, as of this writing, the company has informed the Union that it no longer intends
to provide lifetime coverage to its non-Coal Act retirees, and instead plans to cancel their insurance
coverage at the expiration of the 1993 Agreement. See Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint,
Westmoreland Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, No. 96-26092-MSK, Ch. 11, Adv. No.
98-1160 RJB (Bank'. D. Colo. filed February 25, 1998)[hereinafter In re Westmoreland]; UNITED
STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM'N, FORM 10K at 35-36 (Westmoreland Coal Company, for
period ending Dec. 31, 1997); NEWS RELEASE (Westmoreland Coal Company, Aug. 12, 1997). This
issue has not yet been resolved and is the subject of ongoing litigation at the time of publication.
263
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companies, which allows it to avoid or postpone any and all obligations owed to
both the UMWA Funds and to the Union.264 Since then, the companies have openly
declared their intent to shed all of their Coal Act obligations to directly provide
health care and/or to pay premiums for their Coal Act retirees by means of the
bankruptcy case.
Following the bankruptcy filing, the Trustees of the 1992 Plan commenced
a second lawsuit in bankruptcy court, known in bankruptcy parlance as an
"adversary proceeding," again seeking reinstatement of the company's individual
employer plan, as well as interim injunctive relief and a ruling that the claims of the
1992 Plan are taxes, and thus are not dischargeable in bankruptcy.26 On September
5, 1997, the bankruptcy court denied both requests, although it described the case
as "particularly frustrating" and presenting a "painful dilemma." 66 Instead, it held
that injunctive relief was inappropriate because the claims of the 1992 Plan would
be "recognized" in bankruptcy.267 In other words, as the court explained, they
would be accelerated, reduced to a monetary amount, and paid in accordance with
their "priority" as set forth in the Bankruptcy Code (if there is any money left with
which to pay them), then extinguished forever. The court also denied the plan's
request to treat the claim as entitled to administrative priority, holding instead that
it arose pre-petition because Westmoreland terminated its health plan before filing
its bankruptcy petition.26 Finally, it rejected the plan's argument that Bankruptcy
Code Section 1114269 requires both that Westmoreland continue making its retiree
health care payments and that such payments must be treated as administrative
expenses.2 70

In re Westmoreland Coal Co., No. 96-26092-MSK. Such a filing offers the company an
"automatic stay" of all lawsuits, including the injunction in the Buckner case
264

265

Buckner v. Westmoreland Coal Co., A.P. No. 97-1058-MSK (Bankr. D. Colo. filed Jan. 17,

1997); summaryjudgment granted in part, 213 Bankr. 1 (Bankr. D. Colo. Sept. 5, 1997), appeal
pending,No. 97-AP-2002 (D.C. Col. filed Sept. 5, 1997). Testimony presented in this case listed the
monthly costs of providing these benefits as exceeding $500,000 per month, or close to double the
company's estimate presented in the pre-bankruptcy Buckner case. Buckner, 213 Bankr. at 10 n.8.
266

Memorandum Opinion and Order, Buckner, 213 Bankr. 1.

267

Id. at 21, 28.

268

Id. at 24.

269

11 U.S.C. § 1114 (1994).

270

See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1114(e)(2), 1129(a)(13) (1994).
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Completely disregarding the ample legislative history of the Coal Act, the
court found that the statutory origins of the 1992 Plan indicated that Congress
intended to exclude it from the preferences accorded to all "voluntarily created"
retiree benefit plans under Section 1114. Even more astounding, the court held that
the fact that Westmoreland unilaterally canceled its plan just before filing for
bankruptcy effectively eliminated any protection that it might otherwise have
enjoyed under the elaborate procedural
scheme set forth in that statute for
271
plans.
such
modifying
or
terminating
Curiously, the court's opinion also included the following admission:
Unfortunately, this strict interpretation of the language of
§ 1114 rewards Westmoreland for its prepetition breach of its duty
to maintain its IEP [Individual Employer Plan] under § 9711. Had
Westmoreland maintained its IEP as required, it would have been
compelled to continue making retiree benefit payments during the
course of its Chapter 11 case. Such payments would have been
administrative expenses under § 1114 or § 503. By terminating its
IEP pre-petition, Westmoreland ensured that its Coal Act
obligations would be prepetition claims and removed itself from
the scope of §1114.
To my eye, this result is legally correct but socially
repugnant. It is unjust in popular parlance because it rewards
Westmoreland's breach of its statutory obligations. Successful
evasion of § 9711 may well encourage other coal operators to shed
Coal Act obligations in a similar manner.2 72

271

Buckner, 213 Bankr. at 24-27.

272

Id at 19. The judge continued,
When application of statutory law does not do justice to the popular eye,
the law is viewed as a collection of meaningless technicalities. Such a view
inspires little respect for or compliance with the law. Legal technicalities instead
encourage people to treat the law as a game in which the winner finds the loophole
that excuses compliance. At either extreme, the population grows distrustful...
Under the circumstances presented here, I am compelled to apply § 1114
narrowly, as written. I do so with the fervent hope that if Congress intends
employers to pay or reimburse retiree health benefits during the course of a
Chapter 11 case, no matter the circumstances, it will take such action as necessary
to clarify its intent.

Id. at 20.
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The UMWA 1992 Plan has appealed this ruling, which is now pending.273
In separate litigation, all four UMWA Funds are aggressively pressing their claims
for payment of all amounts they are owed, including all Coal Act obligations,
complete withdrawal liability, and reinstatement of the Coal Act coverage. 4
Interestingly, both the Fourth and the Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals
reached the opposite conclusion on very similar facts while the 1992 Plan's appeal
2 75
was pending in the district court. First, in Adventure Resources, Inc. v. Holland,
an appeal of a bankruptcy case from the Southern District of West Virginia
involving several of the same issues, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's
holding that Coal Act claims were "taxes," and as such had to be accorded the
highest priority status as administrative claims. Reasoning that the act did not take
effect on February 1, 1993, after the filing of the bankruptcy petitions, the circuit
court held that the claims "must necessarily have arisen postpetition," and were
therefore "incurred by the [bankruptcy] estate" as required for administrative
expense priority payment.276
The Adventure court also found, based on the contract between the parties,
that the claims of the Pension Funds were administrative, but for different reasons:
there, it reversed the district court's holding that the claims had no priority status
because they had arisen pre-petition. Instead, it declared that the companies' failure
to reject the collective bargaining agreement under § 1113 acted as an assumption,
which in turn requires that all pre-petition defaults be "cured," and converts any
failure to cure into an administrative expense under § 365(b)(1). As the court
explained,
The primary question before us . . . is whether a debtor in
bankruptcy operating under the aegis of Chapter 11 may...
continue to reap the benefits of its bargain without concern that the

273

See 1992 UMWA Benefit Plan v. Westmoreland Coal Co., No. 97-AP-2002 (D. Colo. filed

Sept. 15, 1997).
274

The litigation is expected to culminate in either reorganization or possibly liquidation of the

companies. Hearings on two competing reorganization plans, the valuation of various claims, and
other issues are currently scheduled for the fall of 1998. As of this writing, these matters are still
pending before the bankruptcy court and Westmoreland has not yet paid any of the hundreds of
millions it owes to the Combined Benefit Fund and the 1992 Plan.
275

137 F.3d 786 (4th Cir. 1998).

276

Id. at 793-99 & n.1I (citing 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B)(i) (1994) and distinguishing In re

Leckie Smokeless Coal Co., 99 F.3d 573, 583 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1251 (1997)).
In Leckie, the court had held that property can be sold "free and clear" of Coal Act claims, despite the
fact that the obligations are taxes. See Leckie, 99 F.3d at 584.
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non-debtor party will be made whole for the debtor's77unfulfilled
prepetition obligations. We hold.., that it may not?
Thus, where the Chapter 11 debtor has assumed the
benefits and obligations of an existing collective bargaining
agreement [under § 1113], but does not comply with its statutory
duty to cure all defaults then extant, any claims arising from the
debtor's failure to cure are entitled to first priority as
administrative expenses of the bankruptcy estate.278
Such a ruling should make it easier for the Union to assert contract-based claims for
its workers against bankrupt employers in future cases.
The Tenth Circuit now agrees. In another case involving a challenge by a
bankruptcy trustee to claims filed by the 1992 Benefit Plan, In re: Sunnyside Coal
Co.,279 it implicitly overruled the Westmoreland court's holdings regarding the
proper treatment of Coal Act claims in bankruptcy. Instead, the Tenth Circuit
agreed with the Second and Fourth Circuits28 ° that Coal Act premiums are "taxes
incurred by the estate," that they continue to accrue on a monthly basis throughout
the bankruptcy case, even if the company is no longer "in business,'"'" and that they
are entitled to first priority payment as administrative expenses.2 2 Thus, operators
such as Westmoreland cannot escape liability to the 1992 Plan simply by getting out
of the coal business or by filing for bankruptcy; instead, they must continue paying
those premiums as they come due. Although the impact of this decision on the
Westmoreland bankruptcy is not yet known, it should operate to help insure health
care funding for the "orphaned retirees" who have been "dumped" onto the 1992
Fund, at least in the short term.

277

Adventure Resources, 137 F.3d at 790-91.

278

Id. at 793.

279

UMWA 1992 Benefit Plan v. Rushton (In re: Sunnyside Coal Co.), No. 97-1276, available

in, 1998 WL 380966 (10th Cir. July 9, 1998).
280

In re Chateaugay Corp., 53 F.3d 478 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 298 (1995);
Adventure Resources, Inc. v. Holland, 137 F.3d 786 (4th Cir. 1998).
281

The court distinguished premiums payable to the Combined Benefit Fund, which cease to

accrue when a company is no longer "in business," with those owed to the 1992 Benefit Plan, which
continue even after a company has filed for Chapter 7 liquidation. In re: Sunnyside Coal Co., 1998
WL 380966 at * 14-16 (comparing 26 U.S.C. §§ 9706, 9711, and 9712(b)(1)).
282

Id.
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As for Mr. McClung and his fellow pensioners, so far, he has been lucky.
Thanks to quick action by the Union back in 1996, his insurance coverage was
reinstated, and he was able to afford the intravenous antibiotics he needed and the
operation to replace his artificial shoulder. However, his luck may soon change
again. Although the company agreed to settle the earlier case and is currently
maintaining its health care plan, it has since rejected the Union's claim that its 1993
collective bargaining agreement requires Westmoreland to provide health care
coverage for its non-Coal Act retirees "for life."283 Instead, the company now
claims that it never promised lifetime health care benefits either to its workers or
to the Union, and that all its obligations will cease when the current collective
bargaining agreement expires on August 1, 1998?8 Thus, the issue of Mr.
McClungs' entitlement to a health card is now being effectively re-litigated in the
Colorado bankruptcy court.
As in the earlier crisis, however, the Union is actively representing both Mr
McClung and his fellow pensioners, as well as Westmoreland's 400 laid-off
UMWA employees who are also entitled to extended health care coverage. It is
participating both in the bankruptcy proceedings and in separate collective
bargaining with Westmoreland over the effects of its shutdown bargaining with
Westmoreland. After the negotiations broke down and Westmoreland declared its
intentions to cancel the coverage, the Union filed a contingent Proof of Claim in the
bankruptcy case in the amount of $62 million, the estimated cost of providing
lifetime benefits to Mr. McClung and his fellow pensioners.28 In response,
Westmoreland filed yet another adversary proceeding case, this time seeking a
declaratory judgment which would allow it to simply cancel all health insurance for
those retirees who are not covered by the Coal Act, and require the retirees instead
to receive their health benefits under the collective bargaining agreement?86 In the
alternative, it sought permission of the court to "dump" these pensioners onto the
1993 Fund. However, it has not offered to pick up its share of their future health
care costs, which have been estimated at between forty-four million dollars and

283

Westmoreland Coal Wage Agreement at 159; see also Opposition to Summary Judgment

Motion, In re Westmoreland Coal Co., A.P. No. 98-1160 RJB (filed May 20, 1998).
284

See Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, In re Westmoreland Coal

Co., A.P. No. 98-1160 RJB (filed April 30, 1998).
285

See Proof of Claim, In re Westmoreland Coal Co., No. 96-26092 MSK (filed by the UMWA

on November 25, 1997); Objection, Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint, In re Westmoreland
Coal Co., A.P. No. 98-1160 RJB (filed Feb. 25, 1998).
See In re Westmoreland Coal Co., A.P. No. 98-1160 RB.
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sixty-two million dollars (by Westmoreland and by the Funds, respectively)? 7 As
of this writing, Westmoreland's Motion for Summary Judgment against the Union
has been denied, and Westmoreland's claims against the 1993 Benefit Plan have
been dismissed."'8 However, the case itself is still pending, along with the other
cases discussed above. To date, Westmoreland has not made any of the past due
payments it owes to either the Combined Benefit Fund or the 1992 Plan, much less
any of the anticipated future costs of covering either its Coal Act pensioners or its
non-Coal Act retirees.
Thus, Mr. McClung's predicament is far from over. It remains to be seen
whether Westmoreland will be permitted to simply cancel his insurance again when
the contract expires, and whether the Colorado court will allow it to do so. Even
so, at least he can count on UMWA-funded attorneys to litigate his case, and can
hope that the 1993 Benefit Plan will cover him if Westmoreland ultimately is forced
into liquidation. In addition, Dixie Woolum and other Coal Act pensioners can
hope that the Funds remain solvent, at least through their lifetime, despite the
Supreme Court's Eastern ruling, so that they can afford to keep going to the doctor
and filling their prescriptions at the drugstore.
Of course, most retired workers are not so fortunate, never having worked
under a union contract, let alone one generous enough to promise them lifetime
health benefits. In addition, it is not uncommon for pensioners to outlive their
employer, or for pension plans to go bankrupt, leaving the elderly without the
benefits they worked so hard and so long to earn. More and more employees today
cannot afford health insurance even while working, and few can even dream of
lifetime, fully paid-up family coverage. Thus, the battle for health care security for
both active and retired workers is likely to continue for many years to come.
VII. CONCLUSION
It is beyond the scope of this Article to suggest any specific or
comprehensive legal reforms. However, having identified some examples of the
problems workers face in winning economic security, it is appropriate to also
identify some broad principles which should guide any attempt at systematic legal
reform.
287

See Proof of Claim, In re Westmoreland Coal Co., No. 96-26092 MSK (filed by UMWA on

November 25, 1997); Objection, Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint, In re Westmoreland Coal
Co., A.P. No. 98-1160 RJB;UNiTED STATES SECUiRTIES AND EXCHANGE COMM'N, FORM 10K at 35-36
(Westmoreland Coal Company, for period ending Dec. 31, 1997).
288

See Order, In re Westmoreland Coal Co., A.P. No. 98-1160 RJB (filed April 29, 1998)

(granting motion to dismiss 1993 Benefit Plan) and Order, In re Westmoreland Coal Co., A.P. No. 981160 RJB (filed May 27, 1998) (denying motion for summary judgment against the Union).
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First, under current law, collective bargaining alone does not offer
sufficient economic security to workers. Given the legal restraints on the economic
weapons a union may use to pressure an employer, most employees do not have the
leverage to negotiate contracts that sufficiently ensure job security. As more
companies recognize their ability to shift capital into lower wage markets, forcing
more and more competition between workers for jobs, it will become increasingly
difficult for unions to restrain companies which choose to abandon their workers
and their communities.
Second, laws protecting workers' rights have not kept pace with changes
in the nature and speed of economic activity. Current business practices - as they
have become more and more ruthlessly competitive - target labor as a principle
source of potential cost reductions. Reform must effectively deal with the
consequences of recent deregulation, globalization of markets, and the view that
fiduciary duties run only to shareholders.
Finally, any reform should address the failure of current formal rules to
reflect the realities of the workplace or the corporate world. Courts are often
restrained from ruling in favor of workers because companies have the ability to
avoid liabilities by re-structuring their corporate form and their transactions. Even
though worker protection laws are numerous, and even to some, overprotective, they
are all too easy to thwart with expensive and creative legal advice. Instead of such
formal rules, labor laws should take a functional look at the employer-employee
relationship, and attempt to pierce the corporate veil and other such legal fictions
which, in the real world, allow capital to reap profits at the expense of workers,
retirees, taxpayers, and society as a whole.2
The barriers and obstacles described in this Article should not be viewed
as a road map for cheating workers, but rather as a short list of soft spots in our
current system of labor and employment protections that require repairs in order to
protect future generations of workers from suffering the same injustices. Laws
protecting corporations and favoring considerations of capital over working people
are entrenched, and will not be changed without first achieving a political and social
realignment that gives real power to workers and their families. Only with the
unified efforts of a broad coalition, including workers, unions, civil rights, religious
and community organizations, and maybe even some progressive corporations, can
such legal reform become a reality.
289

Several excellent articles provide an example of these sorts of reform proposals in the joint

employer context, where companies have attempted to shield themselves from direct collective
bargaining through the use of contractors. See supra Part IV; Becker, supra note 157; Englestein,
supranote 157. Both the Becker article and the Englestein article discuss the use of subcontracting
to avoid government regulation of the employment relationship, and propose some functional solutions
to how the law should view the relationship between a company, its contractor, and the contractor's
employees.
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